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Abstract 
  
Death of firefighters due to structural collapse has been on the rise for the past few 
years, and has not gone unnoticed by the research and firefighting branches of the 
industry.  However, the modes for improving this situation by both are very different.  
While firefighters depend on experience for detection, research organizations have 
invested in developing new technology to detect signs of structural collapse.  Thus far 
neither effort has led to any improvement in the current circumstances.  In order to bridge 
this gap, members of the fire-safety community need to more thoroughly understand the 
reasons for structural collapse due to fire.  Through research and analysis, a case study 
manual analyzing structural steel failures due to fire was developed.  This manual 
contains analysis of the actual mode of failure for the cases chosen, as well as analysis of 
alternative situations for each case that may have led to different outcomes.  The goal of 
this manual is to aid in the teaching and practice of structural steel collapse due to fire as 
a supplement to current knowledge. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Project Development 
 
This project was developed as a piece of a larger research project, Structural 
Collapse Assessment and Visual Cues for the Fire Service: Framework and Prototype 
Development to be started in June of 2006. The proposal for the overall project 
recognizes the void in communication between the engineering community and fire 
services and will attempt to diminish this by creating a first-generation, computer  based 
tool that supports gathering and organizing project  specific information on structural 
anatomy and different forms of building construction and relates this information to 
descriptions of structural performance and possible collapse scenarios.  In order to 
accomplish its objectives, researchers for the proposal discussed above will focus on pre-
incident planning.  
 From the Structural Collapse Assessment proposal came the concept for the 
research and analysis performed for the project discussed herein.  While taking into 
account the trends in firefighter fatalities over the past thirty years, and the lack of 
communication between the engineering research community and the fire services, it 
became apparent that there is a fundamental building block missing in the education of 
both professions.  Fire programs, schools and academies nationwide teach up and coming 
firefighters about the fundamentals of building construction and fire behavior in 
buildings, but they do not address the fundamentals of how such buildings collapse.  
Several reasons for this, as Dunn (1988) states in the first chapter of his book, are the 
inability of the fire service personnel to objectively analyze a collapse after the death of 
one of their own, the lack of a standard definition for collapse in the fire service, and the 
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lack of recorded data pertaining to structural collapse for use by the fire service.  
Similarly, academia teaches engineering students how to design structures at ambient 
temperatures but does not teach how to design for fire conditions, which is in part due to 
the fact that structural engineers are not currently responsible for the structural fire safety 
of buildings.  
 One way to remedy this is for structures to be designed for fire conditions, which 
is outlined in 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Appendix 4: 
Structural Design for Fire Condition.  However, this is not the method currently taught or 
practiced by the engineering community.  In order to supplement current 
curriculum/knowledge, case studies can be a useful tool.  There have been many articles 
written on the effectiveness of using case studies as an educational tool.  For instance, 
one paper (Rens, 2000) states that case studies can be a useful teaching aid that 
promotes higher levels of cognitive thinking and learning through examples. 
1.2 Project Description  
 
The project objective was to develop a case study manual that investigates structural 
steel systems that have collapsed during fire conditions.  In addition, alternative situations 
that could have caused different outcomes will lend themselves to supplement a small 
piece of the structural design education in the field of structural collapse and how 
structural members behave under collapse conditions.  The goal of this manual is to 
introduce how structural steel members can fail by way of fire and to demonstrate 
application of the tools and methods available for these performance analyses.  While the 
cases are specific to certain structures, the means of analyses used can be applied 
generally.  Investigation of steel in this manner will serve to increase awareness of its 
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material properties and behavior under fire conditions and contribute to the teaching and 
practice of performance based structural design for fire conditions and to stimulate 
discussion of the subject area and promote interest in studying the subject further.   
 
 4 
2 Background 
 
In this chapter, the topic of firefighter safety and education is researched to put the 
importance of structural collapse due to fire into perspective.  The trends in firefighter 
fatalities show an overall decrease, but an increase in the number of deaths due to 
structural collapse.  Training for structural collapse should come through education and 
experience; however this does not seem to be the case when reviewing the educational 
material taught to firefighters.  In order to remedy this in the fire service, teaching 
material about the properties and failure modes of materials should be supplemented into 
the education.  To improve this from a structural engineers standpoint, designing 
structures for fire is necessary, and seems to be the rising trend, as seen in the 2005 AISC 
Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Appendix 4: Structural Design for Fire 
Condition, Appendix 4: Structural Design for Fire Conditions.  In order to supplement 
current engineering curricula to incorporate this type of design, case studies can be 
utilized to teach individuals of different failure modes associated with different cases and 
the analyses performed to get those results.  Case studies can also be an effective way for 
teachers to promote individual learning outside the class room.  To conclude this chapter, 
a section has been included that describes state-of-the-are technology being developed by 
NIST, FEMA, and the USFA to predict structural collapse.   
2.1 Firefighter Safety and Structural Collapse 
 
Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to 
structural collapse, (Brassel, 2003).  In 2003, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) prepared a report investigating the Trends in Firefighter Fatalities 
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Due to Structural Collapse in collaboration with the United States Fire Administration 
(USFA).   This report analyzed data from several different studies performed between 
1979 and 2002.  The results relate different parameters taken from the previous studies to 
determine any relationships between, for example, cause of death and a specific fire 
fighting activity or event.  The study found that while firefighter fatalities due to collapse 
have decreased since 1979, the number of deaths caused by being caught or trapped in 
the structure has increased, (Brassel, 2003).  It must be noted that the classification for 
caught or trapped includes cases that were once classified as fell or jumped in the 
USFA data collected for the years 1994-2002, (Brassel, 2003).  Figure 1 below shows 
the percentage of fatalities from the years 1979-2002 by being caught or trapped or 
struck by/contact with object. 
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Figure 1 – Fatalities by Cause of Death (Brassel, 2003) 
 
93 Deaths in 
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71 Deaths in 
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63 Deaths in 
47 Incidents 
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One major result that came from this study that directly affects this research project 
is the fact that the number of fatalities did not decrease drastically with fire fighter 
experience.  This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 below, extracted from the NIST report 
Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002, which compare 
the number of firefighter fatalities with experience and rank.   
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Figure 2 – Fatalities by Years of Experience (Brassel, 2003) 
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Figure 3 - Fatalities by Rank (Brassel, 2003) 
 This result is very important because when it comes to firefighters knowledge 
about structural collapse many say they rely on experience.  One WPI  Interactive 
Qualifying Project team that interviewed local fire officials reported that the officers 
continue their education through classes and certification programs, but much of their 
knowledge in assessing a buildings structural performance came from experience 
(LaMalva, 2005). 
2.2 Guidelines for Fighting Structural Fires 
 
Several warnings and guidelines have been issued to establish procedures for 
structural firefighting that are intended to reduce the risk of death due to structural 
collapse.   
After a similar report to the one listed above was published by the NFPA in August 
of 1999, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health issued a warning to 
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fire departments across the country of the dangers of structural collapse.  This warning 
contained eleven points that should be met by the fire services in order to minimize the 
risk of injury and death to firefighters during structural firefighting, (NIOSH, 1999).  
These steps ranged from pre-incident planning to keeping lines of communication open 
and establishing escape routes.   
The Occupational Safety & Health Administration also publishes Emergency 
Preparedness Guides to warn about structural collapse.  This guide is intended to address 
not only structural collapse due to fire, but also due to natural disasters and terrorist 
attacks.  The guide defines interior and exterior structural collapse due to natural causes, 
such as hurricanes, tornadoes etc. and also from explosions.  It also states that 
emergency responders and rescue workers are the people who generally enter a 
building after a collapse and outlines some of their duties, which may include, assisting 
survivors, extinguishing fires, etc, (OSHA, 2005).    The guide also states site 
management will eventually be under an Incident Command System.  Local responders 
and rescuers will obviously respond first with the State requesting Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) assistance if warranted, (OSHA, 2005).  The guide then 
lists the duties of the Incident Commander and Urban Search and Rescue personnel.  It 
concludes by listing a number of safety hazards that could be encountered by those 
entering the collapsed structure, such as, flooding, exposed wiring, gas leaks, structural 
instability, etc 
One concept that has been developed and used by fire departments across the 
country is the LCES concept.  This stands for Lookouts, Communications, Escape 
Routes, and Safety Zones.  This concept was developed by highly experienced 
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firefighters who, in studying wildland fires that resulted in firefighter deaths, recognized 
certain patterns that contributed to deaths, (Collins, 2002).  This concept has spread to 
not only combating wildland fires, but also structural fires, and other operations, such as 
search and rescue.  The concept is simple: set lookouts at strategic points to evaluate 
hazards, set up clear communications for workers, establish escape routes, and identify 
safety zones.  These four steps may help warn workers of hazardous conditions, enlighten 
the officers in charge of workers locations, and enable workers in danger to get to escape 
routes and then to safety.  While the LCES system seems simple, without having these 
four steps established, many firefighters and rescue workers have died and will continue 
to die in firefighting operations.   
The three guidelines listed above are just a few of the many ways in which fire 
departments are advised to fight fires.  Most fire departments have their own system for 
protocols that may adapt or reflect these guidelines.  Protocols will help to reduce the risk 
due to structural collapse, but an increased knowledge of how structures behave will 
serve to reduce that risk more.    
2.3 Firefighter Education 
 
The IQP, Understanding and Enhancement of Structural Engineering Principles 
Incorporated in Fire Department Databases and Education (2005) there are three books 
that are most commonly used by the fire service to teach firefighters about building 
construction and fire safety.  These books are Building Construction for the Fire Service 
by Francis Brannigan, Collapse of Burning Buildings, A Guide to Fireground Safety by 
Vincent Dunn, and the Firefighters Handbook: Essentials of Firefighting and Emergency 
Response by the National Fire Academy Alumni Association. 
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For the research purposes of this project, these books were analyzed to determine 
the amount and detail of information regarding structural steel properties and behavior in 
terms of collapse.   
2.3.1 Building Construction for the Fire Service, 2nd Edition 
(Brannigan) 
 
This book begins with the chapter on Principles of Construction.  This chapter details 
the importance of studying building construction, stating the most important reason for 
knowing building terms is safety, (Brannigan, 1982) and then gives a discussion of the 
different load cases found in buildings, such as dead, live, concentrated, etc  It then 
proceeds into a basic description of the characteristics of different building materials and 
structural members.   
Skipping ahead to chapter seven brings the reader to the discussion of steel 
construction.  The chapter begins with a description of the basic characteristics and 
properties of steel as a metal, such as the coefficient of expansion, the yield point, and the 
ability to conduct heat.  It then leads to several definitions for structural steel members, 
such as I-beams, channels, plates, etc 
The chapter on steel construction also provides an in-depth discussion of the 
importance of protecting steel from fire, which can be done by steel fireproofing, 
equipping a building with sprinklers, or designing the structure so the steel will be out of 
the range of heat produced by the fire.  The standards for protecting a building against 
fire are set by local and national building codes.  The book provides several case studies 
to analyze what happened in buildings that did not have the appropriate fire suppression 
systems, such as the McCormick Place Fire in Chicago, Ill.  It also provides many 
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pictures to illustrate the points being discussed, however these points could be better 
illustrated with arrows.   
Chapter eleven of this book describes high-rise construction.  The book describes the 
different building construction methods used in high-rise structures from the years 1870 
to the present, and it illustrates the deficiencies with each type of building construction.  
This is an important chapter to the research of this project since many of the high-rise 
collapses in this country have been constructed of steel.   
While this book details and illustrates many properties of building construction for 
steel construction, it does not go into the discussion of how the structural members and 
systems may react physically and mechanically when exposed to different fire conditions.   
2.3.2 Collapse of Burning Buildings, A Guide to Fireground Safety 
(Dunn) 
 
This book begins with an introduction of building collapse and an explanation for the 
lack of recorded data on the subject.  The author states that there are several reasons for 
the lack of information about structural collapse, which include research into the subject 
offers small benefit to anyone except firefighters, and firefighters are usually incapable 
of objectively analyzing the collapse (Dunn, 1988).  Other reasons are the lack of a 
formal definition of structural collapse within the fire service, and the lack of recorded 
data by fire departments across the country.   
This book, like Brannigans, devotes a chapter to building construction terms and 
provides effective pictures to illustrate the building concepts.  The text also details the 
hazards associated with each of the five general types of building construction.  Unlike 
Brannigans book, this text does not devote a chapter to steel construction. However, 
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chapter ten does discuss the concept of lightweight steel roof collapse and the hazards 
associated with it.   
Each chapter of Dunns book gives detailed descriptions of situations that firefighters 
have encountered while fighting fires in the different forms of building construction.  
Each example gives studying firefighters some insight into a hazard associated with that 
type of construction.  The book also offers good illustrations of the construction types, 
and a lessons learned section at the end of each chapter.  
2.3.3 Firefighter’s Handbook: Essential of Firefighting and 
Emergency Response, 2nd Edition (Thomson Delmar Learning) 
 
While Dunns book focuses on collapse in different structures, and Brannigans book 
focuses on building construction, this book covers all of the essentials that may be taught 
to firefighting students, this is a true textbook for the fire service. Like Dunns book 
however there is no chapter dedicated to steel as a building material, just chapter thirteen 
dedicated to building construction. 
This chapter begins with one fire chiefs account of a structural collapse and then 
goes into the factual knowledge about building construction.  It begins by defining loads 
and structural elements.  The text then leads into a brief discussion of the four main 
building materials, wood, steel, concrete, and masonry and states how the materials react 
to fire, which are summarized in a table, as can be seen in Figure 4 below.   
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Figure 4 - Performance of Common Building Materials (Thomson, 2004) 
 
It also discusses new building materials, such as composites and discusses some of 
the problems related to emerging materials.  The chapter then progresses into the five 
types of building construction, fire-resistive (I), noncombustible (II), ordinary (III), heavy 
timber (IV), and wood frame (V), and a discussion of newer construction types, such as 
lightweight steel.  This section also discusses the types of occupancies associated with the 
five types of construction and lists hazards associated with these occupancies.   
 
 
Figure 5 - Occupancy Hazards (Thomson, 2004) 
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The chapter then addresses the issue of structural collapse.  While it does not address 
every issue, it focuses on trusses, roofs and ceilings, stairs, parapet walls, and highlights 
the hazards of structural collapse for a building under construction.  This section also 
provides a list of collapse signs.  The text concludes with a Lessons Learned section 
and glossary of key terms and their definitions used in the chapter.   
This book provides firefighters with a wealth of knowledge and provides real life 
accounts and examples, color pictures, tables and streetsmart tips to help illustrate the 
key points.  Additionally, this book goes farther than the others in describing material 
performance and structural collapse.  It also drives home the point that firefighters need 
to be actively inspecting buildings in their jurisdictions to know the building construction 
in their areas.  While this book provides firefighters with a lot of knowledge on building 
construction there is still much it does not cover.  As can be seen from the books 
discussed above, a whole book could be dedicated to the subject. 
While all three books are good resources for educating firefighters about building 
construction and the associated safety concerns, they provide minimal insight into the 
actual behaviors of the structural members and systems used in the types of construction.  
A supplemental resource to provide this information is needed to offer a better 
understanding of the behavior of the elements of structures.  These books also provide the 
engineering community an insight into the education of firefighters and the importance of 
studying as well as designing for structural collapse.  
2.4 Education through Case Studies 
 
For both the fire protection service and the engineering community, case studies 
provide a useful tool as a supplement for education.  One common belief is that failure 
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case studies can be a useful teaching aid that promotes higher levels of cognitive thinking 
and learning through examples, (Rens, 2000).   
One paper, Forensics and Case Studies in Civil Engineering Education: State of the 
Art (Delatte, 2002) illustrates the various ways in which case studies can be utilized for 
educational purposes; case studies can be used as a course, as is taught at Worcester 
Polytechnic Institute, MA, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA.  They can 
also be used to teach a forensic engineering course as is done at the University of 
Colorado, Denver, University of Texas, and Mississippi State University.  The material 
could also be integrated into existing classes to fortify course material being taught, or to 
aid with the completion of capstone design courses. 
 In 1982, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Technical Council on 
Forensic Engineering (TCFE) was formed.  The goals of this council were to (Delatte, 
2002): 
• Develop practices and procedures to reduce failures; 
• Disseminate information of failures and there causes, providing guidelines 
for conducting failure investigations; 
• Encourage research and education in forensic engineering; and 
• Encourage ethical conduct in forensic engineering practice. 
 
The council performed two surveys of civil engineering departments at accredited 
universities across the country in 1989 and 1998 to determine the use of failure analysis 
in education.  From the questionnaires came the main point that a lack of instructional 
materials (Rens, 2000) was the main reason for the lack of inclusion into the curricula.   
 In order to solve this problem, the University of Colorado, Denver developed a 
website to provide professors and students access to failure data.  The site was 
constructed using information from books, technical reports, journals, television and 
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other credible sources.  While the site is a pilot and is still under construction, it invites 
others to provide cases to be added to the site.   
 The use of case studies in education is a useful tool to illustrate the effects of 
design gone wrong and the implications of those failures.  It has become clear how little 
students generally know about key disasters that are common knowledge to their elders 
and that have had a profound effect on the profession, (Jennings, 2000).  Both at the 
undergraduate and graduate levels, case studies should be implemented into the 
curriculum to supplement and expand students knowledge.    
2.5 Structural Design for Fire Conditions 
 
The structural design of buildings involves analysis of the members involved for 
loads, such as gravity, live, wind, and earthquake loads.  This design does not often 
include designing these members for fire conditions.  This, in part, is due to the fact that 
structural engineers are not currently responsible for the integrity of the structure when 
exposed to fire.  However, a shift in responsibility may be on the horizon.   
In the 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Appendix 4: Structural 
Design for Fire Condition, Appendix 4: Structural Design for Fire Conditions specifies 
means by which members should be designed to account for the effects of fire.  The 
performance objective is stated as structural components, members and building frame 
systems shall be designed to maintain their load-bearing function during the design-basis 
fire and to satisfy other performance requirements specified for the building occupancy, 
(AISC, 2005).  The appendix discusses a number of different fires and material 
properties.  It then goes into the methods for analysis, which include simple analysis 
(lumped heat capacity analysis), advanced analysis (using computer modeling), and 
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qualification testing.  The lumped heat capacity analysis method was utilized in this 
project to determine the temperatures of the steel members analyzed in the cases chosen 
with various thickness and application of three different design fires.   
The importance of case studies in education as detailed above, and the new design 
requirements emerging require students and designers alike to gain a better understanding 
of how structures react when exposed to fire.  Through this project, four cases were 
determined and analyzed to provide data in this area.  While the cases are specific to 
certain structures, the means of analysis used can be applied generally.  The intended goal 
of the case study manual developed is to contribute to the teaching and practice of 
performance-based structural design for fire conditions and to invoke interest in this field.   
2.6 Research and Technology  
 
Over the past few years, researchers have turned their focus to the matter of 
structural collapse.  The National Institute of Science and Technology has developed 
many studies to advance the industrys knowledge in several areas pertaining to structural 
collapse.   
After the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, 
NIST investigated how the towers collapsed.  For this report and for others, such as the 
Rhode Island Station Nightclub (also investigated by NIST), analysis using a Fire 
Dynamic Simulator and Smokeview modeling were used.  To establish these models 
researchers considered fire growth and spread, the impact or potential impact of fire 
safety systems or changes in egress arrangements, and the conditions building occupants 
and firefighters encountered, (Dittmar, 2005).  The information for the factors 
considered was obtained through photographs and videos, recovered steel, eyewitness 
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accounts and emergency communication records, (Newman, 2005).  These software 
packages provide three-dimensional modeling capabilities and were utilized in studies 
done on the behavior of occupants escaping buildings, and on the techniques of structural 
ventilation.   
NIST has also developed a research project to focus on structural redundancy and 
the mitigation of progressive structural collapse.  In collaboration with the United States 
Fire Administration (USFA), NIST has performed a series of full-scale fire tests in four, 
one  story wood frame structures.  These tests were conducted in order to determine the 
feasibility of predicting structural collapse (Stroup, 2004).   
Another research project was also done using full-scale fire tests of wooden and 
lightweight steel building.  The goal was to test a device developed to measure the 
vibrations of burning structures.  Researchers were aiming to discover a way to predict 
structural collapse based on the vibrations of the structure using accelerometers.  While 
the device is still in the testing phases, it may become a vital tool for firefighters in the 
future (Duron, 2003). 
NIST, as well as FEMA, and the USFA have been conducting many studies to 
advance the industrys knowledge of structural collapse and steps that may be taken to 
reduce this risk to those involved.  While collapse detecting devices are on the horizon,  
3-D modeling software has proved very effective in the analysis of fire conditions.  
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3 Literature Review 
 
Steel and concrete are the two main materials used for building high-rise structures.  
Structural steel is generally used to build larger buildings due to the cost of material and 
labor, which is why most of the cases involving steel collapse are multi-story structures.   
One issue that has been discussed since the 1970s is the need for automatic sprinkler 
systems to be incorporated as a feature of high-rise buildings.  Only one of the cases 
investigated through this project was equipped with an automatic sprinkler system, and in 
that case it failed to operate under the exposed fire conditions.   
3.1 McCormick Place 
 
McCormick Place was a large exhibition hall that stood on the shore of Lake 
Michigan in Chicago, Ill.  It was constructed in 1960 of reinforced concrete and structural 
steel and consisted of 3 levels of exhibition space, a large theater, restaurants, and a 
variety of other rooms and supporting spaces.  Large steel trusses supported the roof of 
the structure; they spanned 210 feet column to column and cantilevered 80 feet on either 
side, as can be seen below in Figure 6.   
 
Figure 6 - McCormick Place Roof Truss (Jensen, 1967). 
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At the time of the fire, McCormick Place was hosting the National Housewares 
Manufacturers Association Show, which occupied two levels of the hall.  The booths for 
this show were constructed of plywood, fabrics, and other combustible materials that 
produced a large fire load.  The fire began at around 2 a.m. on January 16, 1967 as an 
electrical fire.  It quickly consumed the entire 3rd floor and spread down to the 2nd floor 
by way of melted expansion joints.  The exhibition portion of the hall was not protected 
with automatic sprinklers and the exposed structural steel was not protected from fire 
exposure.  Lack of fire protection caused excessive heating of the truss members, which 
then led to the collapse of the roof (Jensen, 1967).  
3.2 World Trade Center 5 
 
World Trade Center 5 was a nine-story office building that was completed around 
1970.  Fire in this building broke out due to debris that impacted the building from the 
collapse of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.  The subsequent fires 
caused shear connectors of the column tree assemblies to fail initiating collapse from the 
eighth floor through the fifth floor.  The roof and ninth floor (which contained no column 
trees) as well as the fourth floor and floors below experienced no collapse.  The column 
tree assemblies and conventional framing systems can be seen in Figures 7 and 8 below. 
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Figure 7 - Typical Column Tree System (Barnett, 2002) 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - Interior Bay Framing of WTC 5 (Barnett, 2002) 
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Due to the havoc of the day, the fire burned uncontrolled for several hours.  For 
reasons unknown, the automatic sprinkler system did not activate to aid in the 
suppression of the fire (Barnett, 2002). 
3.3 Alexis Nihon Plaza 
 
The ten-story office building (referred to as the 15-story office building in the 
official report) that was part of the Alexis Nihon Plaza was built atop a five-story 
shopping/parking facility sometime after 1950.  On the evening of October 26, 1986 at 
around 5 p.m., a fire broke out on the 10th floor and spread through stairwell B (see 
Figure 9) up to the 16th floor (there was no 13th floor).  Although the source of the fire 
was undetermined, it was believed to have started in a communications cabinet next to 
stairwell B.   
 
Figure 9 - Alexis Nihon Tenth Floor Layout 
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Most of the areas in the office tower were used for general clerical work.  
However, these areas had considerable amounts of storage in addition to the materials 
stored in the space designated for that use, (Isner, 1986). The additional storage material 
kept could have attributed to the rapid spread and intensity of the fire.  The fire burned 
for 13 hours and 24 minutes after the first alarm (Isner, 1986).  Fire fighting efforts 
were hindered by the lack of water pressure in the standpipes in and around the building.   
At approximately 10:30 p.m., a 30 ft by 40 ft. section of the 11th floor, near where 
the fire was believed to have originated, collapsed onto the 10th floor (Isner, 1986). This 
was the only section of the building that suffered collapse, and upon investigation, the 
collapsed members did not exhibit the properties commonly found of members exposed 
to high temperatures, such as bending, elongation, or twisting, (Isner, 1986).   
3.4 One New York Plaza 
 
One New York Plaza is a 50-story office building that was completed in early 
1970.  On August 5, 1970 a fire broke out on the 33rd floor, which was believed to have 
started in a telephone equipment room.  The fire then spread to the 34th floor by means of 
air-conditioning duct openings.  The fire thrived for five hours on the polyurethane 
furnishings before being controlled by local authorities.  The high temperatures reached 
during the fire caused failure of connections and distortion of the beams and girders 
supporting the 34th floor.  Since the building had just been recently completed, it had not 
yet been fully occupied.   
 The New York Board of Fire Underwriters made several recommendations as a 
result of this fire which were intended for all buildings similar to One New York Plaza, 
high-rise office structures.  These recommendations included banning the use of 
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flammable foamed cushioning, reducing the fire load allowed in fire-resistive 
buildings, protecting steel members with materials that cannot be readily removed, and 
providing fire stops between floors (Powers, 1970).  Many of the recommendations 
provided through this report were incorporated into later building codes.   
The four cases listed above were all constructed of structural steel in some manner.  
Through the investigative reports of these cases, details of the structural systems were 
obtained. Analysis on these systems was then done to determine the effects of fire on 
structural steel and will be discussed in the Sections that follow.   
 
 26 
4 Methodology 
 
To complete this research project, cases had to be chosen to analyze the effect of fire 
on structural steel.  Through this section one can see how each case was determined and 
the analysis done on the cases to produce the results that appear in Section 5.   
4.1 Case Study Research 
 
In order to determine appropriate case studies to be analyzed for this project, 
parameters had to be set.  These parameters were at first general and then became more 
selective as the research process continued.  To begin the search, the requirements were 
cases constructed of a structural steel frame and had experienced a full or partial collapse 
due to fire exposure.   
To complete this search, Internet search engines, such as, Google Scholar, Google, 
and Yahoo were used.  Other resources included books, journals (Fire Journal, for 
example), professional websites (USFA, NFPA, etc), online databases (LexisNexis, 
Firedoc, etc) and information from individuals.  This broad search resulted in several 
papers, studies and reports that noted structural collapses dating back to the 1960s.   
One study done by NIST, Analysis of Needs and Existing Capabilities for Full-
Scale Fire Resistance Testing, which was completed in December of 2002 by Beitel and 
Iwankiw, presented an in-depth investigation into the structural collapses of multi-story 
buildings (4 or more stories) in North America and around the world from the 1950s to 
the present.  The report collected information from news sources, online databases and 
professional organizations.  The information sought was the building name, location, type 
of construction, building height, date and time of collapse, and the extent of collapse, 
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which were then tabulated.  The NIST report also provides information on major fires in 
multi-story structures that did not experience collapse but suffered major structural 
damage.  The information from this report was important in identifying several cases to 
further research.   
Other cases identified for further research Francis Brannigans book.  In Building 
Construction for the Fire Service, 2nd Edition chapters 7, Steel Construction and Chapter 
11, High Rise Construction provided several cases for investigation.  Two of these cases 
were later chosen as cases to be analyzed through this project.    
4.2 Determination of Cases 
 
After a number of cases had been initially investigated, further research of each of 
the cases was then completed.  The initial cases investigated are listed below in Table 1.   
 
Table 1 - Initial Cases Identified for Investigation 
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It proved difficult to find information on many of the cases originally identified due 
to lack of recorded data.  From this research, seven cases were identified which had 
detailed technical reports about the fire and collapse of the structures. These included the 
World Trade Center 1, 2, 5, and 7; Alexis Nihon Plaza; One New York Plaza; and 
McCormick Place. 
The controversy associated with the technical reports about the World Trade 
Center towers, buildings 1 and 2, and building 7 ruled out these cases for further 
investigation, which left the four others previously mentioned.  The structural 
information and knowledge about the fires provided in those technical reports are the 
basis for the analysis performed here in.  The issues investigated for each case are listed 
below in Table 2. 
           
Table 2 - Case Studies & Elements Investigated 
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4.2.1 McCormick Place – Overview 
 
There were 18 structural steel trusses that supported the roof of this building.  
These trusses, as discussed in Section 3.1, spanned 210 feet column to column and 
cantilevered 80 feet on either side.  The trusses were 16 deep above the rigid frame 
support, 10 feet deep at the center, and 5-3-1/2 deep at the cantilevered end, please see 
Figure 6 in Section 3.1.  The truss and rigid frames that supported them were constructed 
of W14 wide flange members and were stabilized by smaller trusses running 
perpendicularly similar to bridging.  The column portion of these frames were protected 
from fire with a sprayed-applied fiber and encased with metal lath and Gypsum 
vermiculite plaster, (Jensen, 1967) up to a height of 20 feet, but the trusses did not have 
any fire protection applied to them.   
Once the fire broke out, it spread rapidly through the exhibition hall.  With the 
large fire load present and an inability to obtain water from the exterior fire hydrants, 
fire-fighting efforts proved futile.  The unprotected steel of the trusses could not 
withstand the excessive temperatures reached by the fire and resulted in a roof collapse 
approximately an hour after the fire began.  It was stated that the roof trusses started to 
buckle in the center, pulling the roof loose from the columns at the walls, (Juillerat, 
1967).   
This case was studied first and became the base case for the analyses performed 
for the others. The reason for this was that through study it clearly demonstrated the 
effectiveness of insulation.  The calculations for this analysis were performed using the 
equations presented in Section 4.3.  While this was the first step in the analysis of the 
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other cases, it was less important because in those cases the steel had been protected with 
insulation prior to the fires.   
4.2.2 World Trade Center 5 – Overview 
 
World Trade Center 5 was a nine-story office building constructed of a structural 
steel frame and composite floors.  The buildings dimensions were 330 ft. by 420 ft. with 
30 ft. by 30 ft. bays.  The roof and ninth floor were constructed using conventional steel 
framing; however the eighth floor and those below were constructed using column trees.  
These trees were constructed of a 4-ft.-W24x61 stub girder shop welded to the columns. 
In the field W18x50 floor girders were connected to the stub girders using shear tab 
connections. Please see Figure 7, in Section 3.2 for a depictive representation.  The 
W24x61 member is a Canadian shape that is similar to a W24x62 with a thinner web and 
shorter depth.  This member size was originally produced by Algoma steel, but is now 
only made by Nucor-Yamato, and the Steel Deck Institute, because of lack of demand.  
The floor system was constructed of 4 lightweight concrete on 1-1/2 metal deck, and 
was attached to the floor beams and girders using shear connectors to create a composite 
floor system.  All of the structural members were fire-protected with a sprayed-on 
mineral fiber that provided a 2-hour fire rating to the floors and a 3-hour rating to the 
columns (Barnett, 2002). 
From the investigative report of this failure, it was determined that the shear tab 
connections failed due to secondary tensile forces developed from catenary action.  
However, in order to come to this conclusion and to provide a thorough understanding of 
the failure, a much more in depth analysis was performed.  The analysis began with 
investigating the drop-span section of the column tree assembly for bending capacity and 
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deflection as a function of time and temperature (calculated using the equations presented 
in Section 4.3.2).  This same analysis was then done for the two alternative situations of 
continuous W24x61 and W18x50 girders replacing the column tree assembly.   
The next step in the analysis was the investigation of the shear tab connections.  
These calculations followed those performed in Appendix B: Structural Steel and Steel 
Connections (Fisher, 2002) of the World Trade Center Building Performance Study 
(FEMA).  These calculations were extended to analyze the bolted connections from 20°C 
(room temperature) to 650°C depending on the fire exposure used.     
4.2.3 Alexis Nihon Plaza – Overview 
 
The ten-story office building was constructed of a structural steel frame of 11  30 
ft. by 30 ft. bays and 3  15 ft. by 30 ft. bays, as can be seen in Section 3.3, Figure 9.  The 
girders (W24x76s), beams (W18x40s), columns and metal decking were all fire-
protected with sprayed-on mineral fiber providing a 2  1/2 to 3 hour fire rating for the 
members.  The girder  to  column, beam  to  column, and beam  to  girder 
connections were made using double clip angles, which were welded to the beams and 
bolted to the columns or girders, (Isner, 1986).   
After the fire, the investigators found little to no distortion, such as bending, or 
twisting, of the steel members that had collapsed.  This led to the conclusion that these 
members were not exposed to excessively high fire temperatures or stresses, (Beitel, 
2002).  The collapse is believed to have occurred because the welds connecting the 
girders and columns failed causing the collapse of a 30 ft by 40 ft. section of the 11th 
floor.   
 32 
 To begin the analysis of this system, the girders material properties were 
calculated using the equations in Section 4.3.2.  Using these values, RISA 2D, a 
structural analysis program was utilized to determine the end shear and moments in the 
girder.  These numbers were then used for analysis of the weld shear capacity for a 
variety of angle sizes, weld thicknesses and strength.  This analysis was also done for the 
bolts.  Comparison of these values along with the capacity of the girder, led to the 
determination of the failure mode at various temperatures for various sizes of angles.  
These modes of failure are summarized and discussed further in Section 5.3. 
4.2.4 One New York Plaza – Overview 
 
One New York Plaza was a 50-story office building, the first 20 stories are 
approximately 222 feet by 286 feet and the next 30 stories (the tower section) are 
approximately 143 feet by 286 feet, (Powers, 1970).  The building was constructed of a 
reinforced concrete core with an outer structural steel frame and a composite floor 
system.  The beams, girders, and columns were all protected with a sprayed-on asbestos 
fiber, which was later found to have not adhered properly to the steel due to rust.  Fire 
which broke out on the 33rd and 34th floors caused shear connections to fail and beams to 
drop onto girder flanges, resulting in a partial collapse of the 34th floor.     
This case was analyzed for the importance of the lessons learned that came from 
it.  There were a number of recommendations made by the investigating committee that 
led both to a change in practice and means of failure in fires to come.  These 
recommendations and their implications are discussed in Section 5.4. 
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4.3 Performance Investigation 
4.3.1 Design Fires 
 
Three design fires were used in the analysis for each of the cases studied.  These fires 
simulated three different scenarios, one being a test scenario and the other two being 
natural fires.   
The first design fire was the ASTM E-119 fire, which is a test fire used to rate the 
performance of building assemblies, such as ceilings and floor systems.  There are a few 
key things to be noted associated with this fire.  The first is that since this fire is 
simulated in a furnace, the tested assemblies are prototypes of the full-scale systems.  The 
second is that structural framing continuity, member interaction, restraint conditions, 
and applied load intensity (Milke, 2002) are not applied while conducting tests under 
this fire exposure.  While the test does not account for many factors like the few listed 
above, it is an internationally established test and is therefore useful for design 
comparisons.  The gas temperatures from this fire were obtained from the ASTM E-119 
time-temperature curve, as can be seen below in Figure 10. 
ASTM E-119 Fire Time-Temperature Curve
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Figure 10 - ASTM E-119 Time-Temperature Curve 
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The second and third design fires used for analysis were a short duration-high 
intensity fire and a long duration-lower intensity fire.  These fires were both defined by 
using a temperature-time relationship equation extracted from Section 4 of the SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, which can be seen below in Equation 1. 
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Equation 1 - Expression for Defining Temperature Time Relationships 
 
 The equation above is used to determine the incline in natural fires.  In order to 
define each of the two fires for use, different values had to be set to determine each.  For 
the short duration-high intensity fire, the values for F=0.12m0.5, C=1.0, and t varied from 
0-0.5 hours.  At t=0.5 hours, it was assumed that the fire decayed at a rate of 20°C per 
minute until returning to room temperature of 20°C.  The short duration-high intensity 
fire curve can be seen below in Figure 11.   
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Short Duration Fire Time-Temperature Curve
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Figure 11 - Short Duration - High Intensity Time-Temperature Curve 
 
 The values used to define the long duration-lower intensity fire were F=0.04m0.5, 
C=1.0, and t varied from 0-1.5 hours. At t=1.5 hours, it was assumed that the fire decayed 
at a rate of 10°C per minute until returning to room temperature of 20°C.  The long 
duration-lower intensity fire curve can be seen below in Figure 12.    
Long Duration Fire Time-Temperature Curve
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 50 100 150 200 250
Time (Minutes)
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 
(°C
)
Long Duration Fire
 
Figure 12 - Long Duration-Lower Intensity Time-Temperature Curve 
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4.3.2 Performance Calculations 
 
Once the temperatures for each of the design fires were obtained, these values 
were then used to calculate the temperature of steel as a function of the gas temperatures 
and time by using a heat transfer analysis and the lumped mass approach.  The lumped 
mass method assumes that the steel has little resistance to heat through conduction, and 
therefore the entire steel member is at the same temperature.  The equation then used to 
acquire the change in steel temperature is seen below in Equation 2.  This equation takes 
into consideration the heat capacity of the insulation as well as the steel as can be seen in 
Figure 13 below.   
 
Figure 13 - Heat Transfer through Insulation 
 
 
Equation 2 - Change in Steel Temperature 
 
Where zeta is a coefficient calculated using the equation in Equation 3 below. 
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Equation 3 – Coefficient 
 
The value of Ai/Vs was calculated using Equation 4 below.  
 
 
Equation 4 - Section Factor Equation 
 
The time step factor ∆t was calculated using Equation 5 below. 
 
 
Equation 5 - Time Step Factor 
 
The other values supplemented into Equation 2 were taken from the tables below. 
 
 
Table 3 - Thermal Properties of Insulation Materials (Buchanan, 2001). 
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Table 4 - Heat Capacities of Steel 
 
For the analysis performed for each case, a spray-applied mineral fiber was used with a 
density of 300 kg/m3 , a specific heat of 1200 J/kg°C, and a thermal conductivity of 0.12 
W/m.  The specific heat of steel was taken as 520 J/kg°C, and the density used was 7850 
kg/m3, which remains essentially constant with temperature (Buchanan, 2001).  The 
calculated value for the change in steel temperature was then added to the previous 
temperature for steel to get the new steel temperature.   
 After the steel temperatures had been calculated for each fire condition, equations 
to obtain the yield strength and modulus of elasticity of the steel associated with those 
temperatures were used.  The equations for these material properties are solely a function 
of temperature and do not account for any losses that may occur.  They are taken from the 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering and can be seen below in Equations 6-9. 
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Equation 6 - Yield Strength for Temperatures between 0°C & 600°C 
 
 
Equation 7 - Yield Strength for Temperatures between 600°C & 1000°C 
 
 
Equation 8 – Modulus of Elasticity for Temperatures between 0°C & 600°C 
 
 
Equation 9 – Modulus of Elasticity for Temperatures between 600°C & 1000°C 
 
The initial yield strength for these calculations, Fy0, was taken as 36 ksi, because when 
the cases being analyzed were built between the 1950s and 1970s; this was the 
predominant strength of steel used for construction.  The initial modulus of elasticity, E0 
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used was 29,000 ksi.  The values calculated were then used as input for the RISA 2-D 
software analysis of the structural systems for the cases described above.   
4.3.3 RISA 2-D 
 
RISA 2-D Educational and Web-Demo are two versions of the RISA 2-D software 
package that allows for the design and analysis of structures.  The two versions differ in 
the level of complexity of the information that can be input and the functions that can be 
performed.  For this research project both versions were utilized to analyze the original 
and alternative structural systems for each of the cases studied.   
The RISA 2-D Educational version was used to analyze structures by adjusting their 
modulus of elasticity values (calculated using the equations in Section 4.3.2) as a 
function of temperature.  This is useful in determining deflection of members as a 
function of temperature.  The approach above was also used in the RISA 2-D WebDemo 
version.  However, by using this version, one could enter in offset distances as a part of 
the member boundary conditions to obtain reactions at the ends of the members that were 
used to analyze end connections.   
The two versions of the RISA 2-D software were useful when analyzing different 
sections of each case study.  The results from these analyses are discussed in Section 5 of 
this report, entitled Results.   
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5 Results 
5.1 McCormick Place 
 
The result of the structural failure at the McCormick Place Auditorium was due to 
the lack of fire protection on the structural steel trusses that supported the structures 
roof.  Without any fire protection, the steel was subjected to the extreme temperatures of 
a fire that resulted from an excessive fuel load.  The temperatures reached in the building 
were unknown, but as can be seen from Figure 33 (Section 5.2.2), the critical temperature 
for most steel members is approximately 600°C and the trusses failed after only 
approximately one hour of exposure the fire (this temperature is marked with the thick 
orange line in the graphs below).  Also the concrete in the lower level of the structure 
where the fire spread was severely spalled and spalling of concrete begins around 500°C.   
When the building was constructed in 1960 in Chicago, Ill, fire protection of steel 
was not a mandatory design feature.  The designers felt there was no need for fire 
protection systems because of the height (fifty feet) at which the trusses were located. It 
was assumed that a fire would not be large enough to substantially affect the integrity of 
the trusses at that height. Therefore, there was no insulation on the steel members and no 
installation of automatic sprinklers. As with the insulation, the sprinklers were omitted in 
the exhibition hall because of the height at which they were to be located was thought to 
be too high for sprinklers to be effective.     
5.1.1 Parametric Study of Spray-Applied Insulation 
 
Analyses were performed in order to determine if spray-on insulation would have 
had any positive effect on the resistance of the steel truss to the fire. This was 
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accomplished by comparing the performance of the unprotected steel truss to that of steel 
trusses with varying thickness of spray-applied insulation.  The insulation was varied 
from ‰ to 1- ‰, and the results were then plotted on the same graphs to enable 
comparison of the effects of the insulation on steel temperature over time. The yield 
strength of the steel (Fy) and the modulus of elasticity (E) of the steel during fire 
conditions were also investigated to illustrate the properties of steel under fire exposure. 
The effects on the steel truss were modeled under the three fire conditions 
previously defined: the ASTM E-119 standard fire, a short duration-high intensity fire, 
and a long duration-lower intensity fire. These three fires each simulated a different 
scenario of fire intensity within McCormick Place and allowed for the analysis of the 
truss integrity under different scenarios.  
5.1.2 Fire Exposure 
 
The three graphs below illustrate the effect of insulation on steel temperature, 
yield strength and modulus of elasticity when exposed to the ASTM Standard E-119 fire. 
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Figure 14 –Effect of Variable Insulation Thickness on Steel Temperatures 
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ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure
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Figure 15 - Effects of Insulation Thickness on Yield Strength 
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Figure 16 - Effects of Insulation Thickness on Modulus of Elasticity 
 
The next three graphs show the effect of insulation on steel temperature, yield strength 
and modulus of elasticity when exposed to a short duration-high intensity fire. 
 44 
Short Duration Fire Exposure
Effects of Insulation
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time (Min)
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 
(°C
)
Fire Curve
No Insulation
1/2" Insulation
1" Insulation
1-1/2" Insulation
Steel Critical
Temperature
 
Figure 17 - Effect of Variable Insulation Thickness on Steel Temperatures 
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Figure 18 - Effects of Insulation on Yield Strength 
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Figure 19 - Effects of Insulation on Modulus of Elasticity 
 
The last three graphs show the effects of insulation on steel temperature, yield strength, 
and modulus of elasticity when exposed to a long duration-lower intensity fire.   
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Figure 20 - Effect of Variable Insulation Thickness on Steel Temperatures 
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Figure 21 - Effects of Insulation on Yield Strength 
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Figure 22 - Effects of Insulation on Modulus of Elasticity 
 
 As seen in the graphs, Figures 14, 17, and 20, above the use of any thickness of 
spray-on insulation would have reduced the temperatures of the steel truss significantly 
during all three design fires. In each case the greatest reduction of heat occurs early in the 
fire which is important because it may have given the fire department sufficient time to 
get the fire under control before excessive heating and structural instability occurred.  
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 The yield strength (Fy) and modulus of elasticity (E) of the steel truss are 
important factors, because when these values are reduced, the strength of the steel is 
reduced, which could lead to failure.  In all three cases, after one hour (approximate time 
of failure) with ‰ insulation the loss of yield strength would have been 10 ksi as 
compared with the truss with no insulation that would have lost approximately all of its 
strength.  Similarly, for the moduli of elasticity graphs, the loss for the ASTM E-119 and 
long duration fires is 5000 psi after one hour.  For the short duration fire the loss is about 
4000 psi for ‰ insulation thickness.  The loss for the cases with more insulation is less 
than that for the ‰ insulation thickness.   Under the short and long duration fire 
exposures one can see that the truss without insulation regains strength as the fire decays.  
This is true to a certain extent but unlike the graph depiction, it will never regain its full 
capacity.  The graphs are off because the equations used to calculate these values only 
account for temperature and no other factors.   
 One difference to note between the short duration fire and the ASTM E-119 and 
long duration fires is the performance of the insulation thickness.  Under the short 
duration fire exposure, there is little difference in the performance if insulation is 
provided. This is due to the fire peaking early and gradually cooling off.  The short fire 
timeline enabled all of the insulation thickness to perform at approximately the same 
levels.  Unlike the short duration fire, a greater thickness is more effective in the ASTM 
E-119 and long duration fires. The differences between 1 and 1‰ of insulation are not 
as great as the difference between the ‰ and 1 of insulation. Because of this, it would 
be a good decision to have at least 1 of insulation under these fire conditions. 
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 The analysis performed in this investigation does not determine the mode of 
failure, however, it was discussed in the investigative report from observation that the 
trusses buckled in the center and a collapse of the roof ensued.  This is the most probable 
situation since the compression members (bottom chord of the truss) would have heated 
the quickest and experienced warping and twisting due to the extreme temperatures 
produced by the fire.  The center of the truss also did not have any diagonal members to 
support the top and bottom chord and therefore had the least resistance to failure as 
compared to the other pieces of the truss.   
5.1.3 Automatic Sprinklers 
 
After the 1968 fire, Underwriters Laboratories (UL) conducted tests to 
investigate whether automatic sprinklers would have been effective in the exhibition hall 
of McCormick Place after the fire in 1968. These tests were conducted following the City 
of Chicagos building code criterion and a ceiling height of 50 feet was considered. 
 In order to recreate the fire, UL constructed booths similar to those located in the 
exhibition hall before the fire.  Automatic sprinklers were then suspended 50 feet above 
the floor to simulate the location of the trusses relative to the fire. Under these conditions, 
it took six minutes from the start of the fire for the first of twelve sprinklers to activate. 
The automatic sprinklers quickly extinguished the fire, and the fire did not spread much 
further than the booth of origin. The maximum temperature experienced by the steel truss 
50 feet above the ground was 510° Fahrenheit or 266°C. 
 These tests conducted by UL, clearly showed that the previous assumptions that 
automatic sprinklers would not be effective from higher distances were false. These tests 
cannot assume that the actual fire would have been extinguished as quickly as was 
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accomplished by the tests, but they do provide evidence that automatic sprinklers would 
have reduced the extreme temperatures experienced and kept the fire under control.  At 
the temperature of 266°C, the steel would have lost very little, if any of its material 
properties.   
5.1.4 Discussion 
 
The analysis done for this case was to determine if spray-applied insulation would 
have made a difference in the structural integrity of the steel truss.  In order to determine 
this, the lack of insulation was compared to variable thickness of insulation under three 
different fire conditions.  These values were calculated using the time-step calculation 
method previously discussed to obtain the steel temperature.  The values of steel 
temperature were then used to obtain the material properties, yield strength and modulus 
of elasticity.   
From the analysis it was determined that even a ‰ spray-applied insulation would 
have greatly reduced the temperatures reached by the steel and would have allowed the 
truss to better maintain its structural integrity.   
5.2 World Trade Center 5  
 
The World Trade Center 5 case study served as the base case for the analysis 
performed in this project.  There were several reasons for this, the first being that it was 
the most recent failure of the cases studied.  It was also the case with the most known 
information and analysis as to why the failure occurred.  The information provided in the 
technical report of the failure (Barnett, 2002), as well as in the appendices of the World 
Trade Center Building Performance Study (FEMA, 2002) report allowed the author to 
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investigate alternative situations for the framing of the building to illustrate how steel 
performs when subjected to fire.   
5.2.1 Floor Framing Analysis 
 
As discussed in section 4.2.1, the original framing system for the World Trade 
Center 5 consisted of column tree assembly from the 4th through the 8th floor and 
conventional framing of the 9th floor and roof, as shown in Figures 7 and 8 of Section 3.2.   
The steel beams and girders were topped with a lightweight concrete/metal deck floor to 
form a composite floor system.  Performance under fire condition was modeled using the 
RISA-2D Educational software.  In order to describe fire conditions for input into RISA-
2D, time-step temperature calculations were done to determine the temperature of the 
steel with ‰ insulation, 1 insulation, and 1-1/2 spray-applied mineral fiber insulation 
when exposed to the ASTM E-119 fire, a short duration-high intensity fire, as well as a 
long duration-lower intensity fire.  Once the temperatures of the steel were calculated (at 
every 50° C, gas temperature), the yield strength and modulus of elasticitys that 
corresponded to those temperatures were calculated using equations from the SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, samples of these calculations can be found in 
Appendix B.  The moduli of elasticitys were then input into RISA to calculate the 
deflections associated with the increase in the temperature of the steel due to fire 
exposure.  In order to approximate the behavior of the actual composite floor system, the 
moment of inertia for the drop-span girder (W18x50) was adjusted to be equal to the 
moment of inertia for the composite system.  Also, the distributed load input to the 
program only reflected the live load to which the system would have been subjected, in 
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order to account for shoring during construction, or any original camber that may have 
been present in the girder.  Samples of these models can be seen in Appendix B.   
 The original model was then revised to replace the column tree system with (1) a 
W24x61 continuous girder and (2) a W18x50 continuous girder.  The moments of inertia 
for both these beams was adjusted to reflect the moments of inertia of the composite 
systems, and both of these framing systems were exposed to the same loads seen by the 
original model.  Both of these alternatives also used adjusted moduli of elasticitys to 
reflect temperature for the varying insulations, as done in the original analysis.   
 The deflections for each of these systems for exposure to the three different fire 
exposures previously mentioned can be seen in the figures 23, 24, and 25 below for ‰ 
insulation thickness.     
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Figure 23 - Deflections under ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure 
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Short Duration Fire Exposure
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Figure 24 - Deflections under Short Duration-High Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
 
 
Long Duration Fire Exposure
1/2" Insulation
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 200 400 600 800
Temperature (°C)
De
fle
ct
io
n
 
(In
ch
es
)
Column Tree - 1"
Insulation
W24x61 - 1" Insul.
W18x50 - 1" Insul.
 
Figure 25 - Deflections under Long Duration-Lower Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
The next three graphs show the deflections for each design fire using 1 insulation 
thickness.  
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Figure 26 - Deflections under ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure 
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Figure 27 - Deflections under Short Duration-High Intensity Fire Exposure 
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Long Duration Fire Exposure
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Figure 28 - Deflections under Long Duration-Lower Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
The next three graphs show the deflection for the original and alternative framing 
systems with 1-1/2 insulation thickness, subjected to the three design fires.   
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Figure 29 - Deflections under ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure 
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Short Duration Fire Exposure
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Figure 30 - Deflections under Short Duration-High Intensity Fire Exposure 
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Figure 31  - Deflections under Long Duration-Lower Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
For all three insulation thicknesses, one can see that the behavior under the ASTM E-119 
curve and the long duration fire are very similar.  It can also be seen that as the insulation 
thickness becomes greater, the deflection drops.  An interesting point to note from these 
graphs is the similarity in behavior of the deflection patters, but the large difference in the 
amount of deflection between the continuous beams and the column tree assembly.   
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 One should also note that the deflection limits of 0.73 (L/360) in the original 
case (L=22) and 1 (L/360) for the two continuous span alternative cases (L=30) is 
never exceeded under all three-fire conditions.  This shows that all three framing systems 
could have theoretically handled the loads under the exposed fire temperatures so the 
system would not have failed due to deflection.   
 The technical report on this failure states the structural damage due to the fires 
closely resembled that commonly observed in test assemblies exposed to the ASTM E119 
Standard Fire Test, (Barnett, 2002).  It then goes on to say that the local collapse 
appeared to have begun at the field connection where beams were connected to shop-
fabricated beam stubs and column assemblies, (Barnett, 2002). 
5.2.2 Shear Tab Connection Analysis 
 
The next step in the analysis process was to examine the shear tab connections 
where the failure appeared to have begun.  In Appendix B of the World Trade Center 
Building Performance Study (Fisher, 2002), the three-bolt capacity, double shear 
capacity, and the tensile capacity of the shear tab connections were calculated at room 
temperature and at 550° Celsius.  This was done by adjusting the yield strength values of 
the bolts by a factor determined from Figure 32 below; extracted from Appendix A, 
Overview of Fire Protection in Buildings, WTC Building Performance Study.   
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Figure 32 - Strength of Steel at Elevated Temperatures (qt. Milke, 2002) 
 
 For the purpose of this project, these calculations were extended to obtain the 
capacities of the shear tabs in the temperature range from 20°C (room temperature) to 
700 °C.  The critical temperature for steel beams/girders is listed in Figure 33 below is 
roughly 600 °C, which is taken to mean the temperature where the steel has lost 
approximately 50 percent of its yield strength from that at room temperature, (Milke, 
2002) and it is a theoretical assumption that connections will degrade at the same rate or 
slower as the members they are connecting.  If this is true then the connections should not 
have failed until about 600°C, and from the technical report it states failure at a 
temperature of 550°C or less.   
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Figure 33 - Critical Temperatures for Various Types of Steel (Milke, 2002) 
        
Shown below, in Table 5, are the calculations for the three-bolt capacity of the 
connections, the 3-bolt shear capacity, double shear capacity, the tensile capacity, and the 
block shear capacity.  While block shear was not a design requirement defined in the 
1963 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication & Erection of Structural Steel 
Buildings, it has been calculated for research purposes.  The tabulated values for the 
double shear capacity are compared to the plastic shear capacity of the W24x61 girder 
and W18x50 girder and are greater; therefore the connections could handle the shear 
produced under the fire conditions. These shear values do not include the added shear 
that was produced from the collapsed floor weights.  From Table 5 it can be seen that the 
governing mode of failure was from larger tension forces produced by catenary action 
than could be withstood by the shear tab connection.  Since these forces are not present 
under normal conditions, they would not have been originally designed for.  The second 
mode of failure seen from the table would have been block shear, which was also not a 
design requirement at the time it was designed.  The capacity of the block shear at 200°C 
is less than the double shear capacity of the bolts and W24x61 girder at 550°C.  In order 
to improve this, the thickness of the plate would have to double or a different bolt 
configuration could be tried.   
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Table 5 - Steel Connection Capacities 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 
Catenary action is a phenomenon that occurs in composite beams as a result of 
thermal expansion in the member due to elevated temperatures.  In all buildings, beams 
and girders have a certain amount of end restraint, even if simply supported.  The end 
restraints, although negligible at normal temperature, become significant at elevated 
temperature because of restraint to thermal expansion may cause enormous internal force 
and moment within the structural member, (Yu, 2005).   
Catenary action was studied for the first time after the Cardington fire tests, 
conducted in 1995 on an 8-story composite steel frame.  From these tests it was 
determined that when fire temperatures were below 400°C the slab acted as an extension 
of the compression flange of the structural steel and had little influence on the system, but 
when temperatures exceeded 500°C the slabs became a very influential part of the 
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system.  The influence of membrane tensions in the slab cannot be ignored, particularly 
when a fire compartment is subject to high horizontal restraint from surrounding cool, 
stiff structure, or when it is vertically supported around its perimeter at protected lines of 
support. When the double-curvature deflections of floor slabs become large the influence 
of tensile membrane action can become very important in supporting the slab loading, 
(Huang, 2002).  This tensile membrane action or catenary action can be useful in 
preventing a progressive collapse; however if the tensile forces developed are larger than 
the tensile capacities of the connections, the system will fail.  This is the mode of failure 
that was believed to have occurred in the World Trade Center 5 column tree assemblies 
(Barnett, 2002). In Figure 34 below, one can see the catenary action developed in the 
upper floors that had typical structural framing. 
Figure 34 - Catenary Action in WTC 5 
 
Catenary 
Action 
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Since the destruction of the World Trade Center Plaza, there has been much 
research done to investigate this phenomenon.  Currently, tensile catenary action of floor 
framing members and their connections has been neither a design requirement nor a 
design consideration for most buildings, (Barnett, 2002).  One paper entitled 
Considering Catenary Action in Designing End-restrained Steel Beams in Fire (Yu, 
2005) provides simplifie equations needed to calculate the forces due to catenary action 
as a function of temperature for end restrained beams.  Calculations using these equations 
were then compared to calculations done using the traditional design method to determine 
any advantages to using this approach.  It was found that there was an advantage to using 
this new method when comparing beams with only axially restrained ends, but there was 
little advantage when the members had a fair amount of rotational end restraint (Huang, 
2005).  
Other studies have been done to determine the effectiveness of catenary action in 
preventing progressive collapses due to explosions.  One study performed at the 
University of California, Berkeley, (Astaneh-Asl, 2006) tested the effectiveness of adding 
steel cables to floors, either during construction, or after, as a retrofit to prevent 
progressive collapse.  The testing was performed on a one-story structural steel 
composite building constructed with a portion of the floor containing the steel cables and 
a portion without them.  Each section was tested by removing one of the main columns to 
obtain the maximum loads experienced by the system.  The section that did not have steel 
cables, was then retrofitted to have steel cables and the old connections were replaced.  
The same test that was performed on the other sections was then performed on this new 
section, and the loads were obtained.  It was determined from these tests that if a building 
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was designed with steel cables inside the slab, it could withstand load up to three times 
the design load; without cables, the system could withstand loads up to 1.2 times the 
design load; and the retrofitted section could withstand loads up to 1.5 times the design 
load.  The conclusions from this study determined this design would be an economical 
way to prevent against progressive collapse (Astaneh-Asl).   
While designing for catenary action was not a primary concern before September 
11, 2001, it has become a very important topic.  Just as there are active and passive 
techniques for fire protection, there are active and passive strategies for preventing 
against collapse.  Active methods involve the capability to respond and to adapt to the 
stimulus, which would involve introducing sensors that can be monitored and send 
signals to mechanical devices, similar to those studied above with the addition of steel 
cables.  Passive ways would be taking catenary action into consideration when designing, 
building in redundancies, etc  Either way, with the knowledge gained from the World 
Trade Center, catenary action should be taken into consideration during design.    
One way to advance this study would be to gain a greater understanding of the 
catenary forces that were created, and compare those values with the tensile strengths of 
the plates.  An alternative was to advance this study would be to alter the RISA model to 
incorporate column degradation as a function of time and temperature. 
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5.3 Alexis Nihon Plaza 
 
As stated in Section 4.2.2, the believed cause of failure in this case was the welds 
that held the angle connecting the girder to the column flange.  Investigation concluded 
that the section that collapsed was not exposed to excessively high temperatures from the 
fire (Isner, 1986).   
5.3.1 Floor Framing Analysis 
 
The floor framing system was comprised of W24x76 girders and W18x40 floor 
beams and a concrete composite floor.   The girders were connected to the column 
flanges by way of clip angles that were bolted to the webs of the girders and welded to 
the column flanges.  In order to examine all aspects of this failure, the original floor 
system was modeled using RISA-2D WebDemo version.  This version was utilized 
because of its capabilities to enter offset distances, which were needed in order to analyze 
the behavior of the system with the eccentricities associated with the welded end 
conditions.  The welded clip angles were modeled as springs, and the girder was offset 
1.5 on each end to determine the moments and shears that would act through the bolted 
and welded portions of the connection.  These values were then used to analyze the 
capacities of the bolts and welds for various angle sizes and thicknesses exposed to the 
three fire conditions previously determined.  
5.3.2 Angle Connections 
 
The information on the connections for this case was extracted from High-Rise 
Office Building Fire, Alexis Nihon Plaza, which was the investigative report of the 
failure.  The report did not provide any data on the size of the angles, weld thickness and 
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strength, or the number of bolts for each connection.  Data on the connections could not 
be found in a wider search of the literature.  To get a range of data for analysis, angles of 
various sizes were used to calculate the shear capacity of the welds and the tensile, shear, 
double shear, bearing, and block shear capacities of the bolts.  The capacities are 
calculated based on geometry and material properties; they would be compared with the 
forces predicted by analyses.  Weld capacity is calculated using the moment produced 
from the girder, and the length of weld, which changes with the size of the clip angle.  
The shear capacities of the welds, bolts, and girder can be seen in the graphs below.  The 
bolts were calculated for an L8x8x1/2 angle and an L8x8x1/4 angle.  The shear 
capacities of the welds were calculated for weld metal with both a 60 ksi and 70 ksi 
tensile strength. The steel temperatures were calculated for ‰, ¾, 1, and 1-1/2 
insulation thickness for the three fire exposures.  The 3/4 insulation thickness is the 
thickness that was present in the original design.  To illustrate the difference in shear 
capacities of the structural elements, the capacities of the welds, bolts and girder were 
placed on a single graph for each of the three design fires.  The solid red line seen in 
these graphs is the end shear produced by the girder on the connections.  The three graphs 
shown below in Figures 35-37 are for a ‰ angles and a 7/16 fillet weld with a 60 ksi 
electrode.  The 60-ksi weld metal was chosen because it produces the worst-case 
scenario.    
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Capacity vs. Temperature
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Figure 35 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 7/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 36 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 7/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 37 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 7/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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The three graphs shown below, Figures 38-40, illustrate the shear capacities for the 
elements listed above, for a variably sized ‰ angles and a 1/4-60 ksi weld.   
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Figure 38 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 1/4" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 39 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 1/4"fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Capacity  vs. Temperature
Long Duration Fire Exposure - 3/4" Insulation
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Figure 40 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 1/4" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
 
The three graphs below are the shear capacities of the structural elements for … angles 
with a 3/16- 60 ksi weld.   
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Figure 41 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 3/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Capacity  vs. Temperature
Short Duration Fire Exposure - 3/4" Insulation
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Figure 42 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 3/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 43 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 3/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
 
The final three graphs shown are the shear capacities of the structural elements for a … 
angle and a 1/8-60 ksi weld.   
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Capacity vs. Temperature
ASTM Fire Exposure - 3/4" Insulation
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Figure 44 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 1/8"fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 45- Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 1/8" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 46 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 1/8"fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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By looking at the twelve graphs above, the difference in strengths of variably sized ‰ 
angles with 7/16 welds to variably sized … angles with 1/8 welds is obvious.  Below 
are tables summarizing the modes of failure by temperature for each of the cases 
illustrated.   
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Case # 1: 
 
½” Angle – 
7/16” Weld 
600°C 625°C 650°C 
ASTM Bolt Shear   
Short    
Long Bolt Shear Block Shear L7x4x1/2 
  
Case # 2: 
 
½” Angle – 
¼” Weld 575°C 585°C 600°C 610°C 650°C 
ASTM L7x4x1/2 L8x4x1/2 L8x8x1/2 L9x4x1/2   
Short      
Long L7x4x1/2 L8x4x1/2 L8x8x1/2 L9x4x1/2 
Block 
Shear L8x6x1/2 
 
Case # 3: 
 
¼” Angle 
3/16 ” 
Weld 
425°C 533°C 500°C 575°C 600°C 625°C 
ASTM L7x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x6x1/4 
Bolt Shear  
Short       
Long L7x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x6x1/4 
Bolt Shear 
Block 
Shear 
 
Case # 4: 
 
¼ ” 
Angle 
1/8” 
Weld 
50°C 200°C 320°C 500°C 585°C 600°C 625°C 
ASTM L7x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x6x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x8x1/4 
Bolt Shear  
Short L7x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4     
Long L7x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x6x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x8x1/4 
Bolt Shear 
Block 
Shear 
 
Table 6 - Failure Modes for Various Angles and Welds 
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 Under normal conditions, all of the angles and welds investigated were adequate 
but as temperatures increased due to the three simulated fires, it is apparent how long 
each weld would effectively last.  It is an assumption that connections degrade at the 
same rate as the members they connect; however, as can be seen above, this is not the 
case since the plastic shear capacity of the beam never reached the yielding end-shear 
strength of 59.18 kips.     
The investigative report for this failure stated the: 
Girders and beams supporting the collapsed section of the floor slab were virtually 
straight and did not have the typical distortion such as bending, elongation, or twisting 
associated with steel frame members that have been exposed to excessive heat and high 
temperatures.  In locations within the building, the welds that secured the clip angles to 
the columns broke, resulting in the failure of girder-to-column connections (Isner, 
1986).   
 
The reason for the welds breaking was not investigated through that report, but 
suggestions for the failure were offered, which included, effects of fire on welds, quality 
and adequacy of the welds, and the possible effects of secondary and thermal stresses, 
(Isner, 1986). 
 Through the four cases illustrated above, the effect of fire on welds is clearly 
visible.  Since the failure was attributed to breaking of the welds, cases two through four 
provide scenarios governed by failure of the end welds.  It was stated that the floor 
system was not exposed to excessive temperatures, case #4 demonstrates that weld failure 
may occur at temperatures as low as 50°C.   
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5.3.3 Weld Quality 
 
Weld quality is a major factor in terms of structural adequacy.  There are many 
components that go into the welding process and if one of these is altered then the quality 
of the weld could suffer.  There are six common defects when discussing weld quality, 
these being: incomplete fusion, inadequate joint penetration, porosity, undercutting, 
inclusion of slag, and cracks, (Salmon, 1996).   
 Incomplete fusion, as the name implies, occurs when the two metals being welded 
do not fuse completely.  Several reasons why this may occur is the condition of the 
surface of the base metal, insufficient weld current, and welding the two metals together 
too quickly.  Inadequate joint penetration occurs when the weld does not penetrate to the 
depth specified.  This can occur by improper design, rapid welding, lack of welding 
current or the use of too large an electrode.  Porosity in a weld refers to when gas pockets 
form and are trapped in the weld.  This defect occurs by using too high of a current or an 
arc length which is too long.  Undercutting means a groove melted into the base material 
adjacent to the toe of a weld and left unfilled by weld metal, (Salmon, 1996).  This can 
occur by using too much current or too long of a welding arc.  Slag inclusion is a defect 
that occurs when slag, a metal compound formed by the chemical reaction, is trapped by 
rapid cooling.  Cracks are perhaps the most harmful of weld defects, (Salmon, 1996).  
Cracks may occur in the weld, base metal, or both due to internal stresses.  Un-uniform 
heating, and rapid cooling can also cause cracks in the weld (Salmon, 1996). 
 Most of these defects can be prevented by establishing good welding procedures, 
use only pre-qualified welders, use qualified inspectors and have them present, use 
special inspection techniques when necessary, (Salmon, 1996).  While proper practice 
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and inspection are required under normal conditions to ensure good weld quality, the 
quality of welds under fire conditions has not been studied.  Tests are required to 
determine the behavior of welds when exposed to fire.  Until these are done, heat transfer 
analyses like the ones performed above or finite element analyses must serve as the basis 
of understanding welds under fire conditions.   
5.3.4 Discussion 
 
The investigative report for this fire established the reason for the failure but 
merely speculated on the reasons for its occurrence.  Through the analysis of this case, 
several parameters were investigated to determine if changes could have been made to 
prevent the failure.  These parameters included insulation thickness, angle size, weld 
thickness and weld strength.   
From the analysis it was determined that the insulation thickness did not alter the 
results significantly.  Changes in the angle size, weld thickness and strength however 
altered the outcomes greatly.  As can be seen in Table 6 above, the ‰ angle, with 7/16 
weld, strength 60 ksi, would have failed by bolt shear at 600°C before any of the weld 
thicknesses tested failed.  As the angle sizes decreased and the weld sizes decreased, 
failure of the welds became the governing mode of failure.  As can be seen from Table 6, 
certain configurations of angles and welds could have contributed to failures at 
temperatures between 50°C and 320°C which are far less than the critical temperature of 
600°C for steel beams.   
The output from the analysis done for this case illustrates the potential for weld 
failure at relatively low temperatures.  The prevailing notion is that beam failure would 
occur before connection failure due to the location and size of the connections.  However, 
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the results presented above disprove that notion.  To get a more realistic picture of the 
shear forces and moments sustained by the welds, one could proceed with the RISA 
analysis and alter the strength of the columns with time as a function of temperature.  
One could also perform a finite element analysis for just the angles to determine the 
internal stresses in the member.   
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5.4 One New York Plaza 
 
 One New York Plaza was a case chosen to illustrate the lessons learned that 
were generated from this fire.  While member collapses occurred due to the failing of end 
connections and lack of fireproofing, these were very localized and did not give way to a 
progressive collapse.  The importance of this case is the recommendations that came from 
the report, some of which changed local law and practices, and some of which went 
unheeded and the consequences of such actions would be seen again.   
 There were fourteen recommendations that came from the investigative report of 
this fire.  The recommendations made were for all buildings similar to One New York 
Plaza and not specific to just that building.  The recommendations are listed below 
(Powers, 1970): 
1. The use of highly flammable foamed cushioning should be prohibited. 
2. The total fire load of fire resistive buildings must be reduced or automatic 
sprinklers installed. 
3. Wire (power and communication) in any part of an air conditioning system should 
be encased in metal conduit or ducts. 
4. The protection of steel members in a really fire resistive building must be 
accomplished by materials that cannot be readily removed or damaged.  It is 
apparent that sprayed fiber may not be universally applied to the proper thickness, 
that proper adhesion to steel may not take place and that the protection may be 
removed in many locations, such as at partitions, where ducts or wiring is run, and 
where clamps and brackets are attached.   
5. Vertical flues in exterior walls between the skin and inner walls of partition 
should be cut off at each floor by a horizontal fire barrier with fire resistance 
equal to the floor. 
6. Where openings through floors for air conditioning ducts are permitted, the duct 
should go directly to a non-combustible material in the duct passage. 
7. Wiring connections through floors should be provided with thermal insulation to 
prevent transmission of heat thereby negating the fire resistance of the floor. 
8. Air conditioning system should preferably be restricted to serving only one floor. 
9. Automatic smoke detectors should be provided at each opening in the return air 
shaft unless the building is sprinklered. 
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10. Air supply for computer rooms should be from a location remote from the 
building air-conditioning intake and discharge, so that the computer rooms will 
not be subject to smoke from fires in other sections of the building. 
11. Means should be provided for venting the building during a fire.   
12. Elevator call buttons should not be of a type that will call and elevator to a floor 
because of heat, smoke or flames. 
13. Prefire plans should be drawn up for all buildings.  This should include 
procedures for notifying occupants, calling the fire department, routes of exiting 
form the various floors and protection of valuable equipment.   
14. Special equipment for fire department use for operating windows, shutters, fans 
and elevators should be provided and a planned procedure for emergency 
operation of the air conditioning system should be formulated (Powers, 1970). 
 
In some respects, building design and construction has come a long way since this fire.  
Advancements in fire protection and compartmentalization have aided in the containment 
of fire.  Buildings of a certain size and classification must now be equipped with 
automatic sprinklers by law.  Also required by law are pre-fire plan evacuation routes, 
lighted exit signs, and other requirements to aid in preserving lives.     
 The three major recommendations that failed to initiate any change are numbers 
one, four and eight.  While fire retardant material is more commonly used today, plush 
furniture and excess material continue to severely increase the fuel loads in buildings.   
 Due to cost, the means of insulating steel and air-conditioning a building have not 
changed.  The issue of insulating steel in a manner that does not sacrifice the integrity of 
the steel if removed has been seen time and time again in the aftermath of One New York 
Plaza.  Most recently are the cases of World Trade Center collapses.  In the case of One 
New York Plaza, the steel beams were insulated with a spray-applied asbestos fiber, 
however due to rust on the original steel; the fiber did not adhere properly.  Also, in 
places that the protection did adhere, it was removed for the installation of ducts, wiring, 
or other necessary work.  The fire began and quickly spread through openings in the 
ceiling where the tiles had been removed for wiring.  The combination of the missing 
 78 
ceiling tiles and the lack of insulation allowed excessive heat to penetrate the steel.  The 
temperatures reached resulted in bending and twisting of the steel beams and shear failure 
of the end connections.   
 In the 1970s there was a large demand for sprinkler installation throughout high-
rise buildings.   Since then, it has been the trend to decrease the thickness of insulation if 
automatic sprinklers have been installed.  However, the effectiveness of automatic 
sprinklers is not certain, as seen in WTC 5 when the sprinklers did not operate to control 
the fire.  In many cases automatic sprinklers become inoperable, for example, when the 
metal heads fuse due to the heat generated by the fire or are designed incorrectly.   
 While it is more economical to reduce the insulation if adding automatic 
sprinklers, it may not be the best option from a structural standpoint.  If the sprinklers are 
ineffective, then the structure is left exposed to the fire.   
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6 Discussion 
 
An important note to make when researching case studies for this project was the 
lack of data available for many cases.  As acknowledged by Dunn (1988) in Collapse of 
Burning Buildings: A Guide to Fireground Safety and Beitel and Iwankiw (2002) in 
Analysis of Needs and Existing Capabilities for Full-Scale Fire Resistance Testing, there 
is a lack of recorded data to accompany failures due to fire.  In order to study and gain a 
comprehension of the subject through case studies, information regarding failures due to 
fire need to be more consistently recorded and assembled in some form that is available 
for study.   
As can be seen in the 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, 
Appendix 4: Structural Design for Fire Condition, the trend is towards structural 
engineers becoming responsible for the design of structures when exposed to fire 
conditions.  Since this has not been a design requirement in the past, structural engineers 
need to be educated in methods in which to perform these analyses and their implications.  
This can be partly accomplished through the study of cases that deal with failures due to 
fire.   
There are several assumptions that must be noted when studying this manual.  The 
first, and perhaps most important, was the assumed mode of failure for each case.  These 
were determined from the investigative reports of the failures studied.   
Other assumptions made involved the heat transfer analyses.  The analyses 
performed in this project to determine the steel temperatures and material properties 
(yield strength and modulus of elasticity) are based on the lumped mass heat transfer 
method.  In order to use this approach, certain assumptions were made.  The most 
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important assumption is the temperature of the steel throughout the entire cross section is 
at the same temperature in order to simplify analysis.  This is based on the fact that steel 
is a good conductor of heat; however a constant temperature throughout a member is not 
generally the case under real fire conditions. Other assumptions made in these analyses 
were the values for the material properties of the steel and insulation, which can be seen 
in Tables 3 and 4.   
Secondary analyses of the connections in the World Trade Center 5 and Alexis 
Nihon Plaza cases involved the use of RISA-2D structural analysis software.  This 
software was used to determine the forces in the members of the framing systems for 
each case.  For input into this program, some information was known, but not all, which 
led to assumptions of the boundary conditions, material properties, and loading of the 
members.  One major assumption made was that as the steel girders in the composite 
systems degraded the columns maintained their original properties.  While columns often 
have a thicker fire protection layer and lag the degradation of the other members, they do 
still degrade to some extent with respect to fire.   
 In the case study manual developed through this project, two major points have 
arisen.  The first is the importance of insulation, which includes but is not limited to, the 
insulation material, its application, and the quality control issues that arise with 
insulation.  As was discussed in the recommendations from the One New York Plaza 
investigative report, the application of spray-applied insulation material needs to be 
controlled or inspected in a manner as to ensure effectiveness.  This point was again 
raised in the FEMA World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, 
Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations 30 years later.  
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The second point was the need for an in-depth study of the behavior of 
connections.   
The performance of connections seem to often determine whether collapse is 
localized or leads to a progressive collapse.  In the standard fire tests of structural 
members, the member to be tested is wedged into a massibe restraining frame.  
No connections are involved.  The issue of connection performance under fire 
exposure is critical to understanding building performance and should be a subject 
of further research, (Milke, 2002). 
 
 Three of the four cases examined suffered collapses due to connection failure.  In 
the analysis of the World Trade Center 5, it was determined that the shear tab connections 
failed due to extreme tensile and shear (due to collapse loads) forces acting on the 
connections.  The design of simple shear connections would not have included analysis 
for the secondary tensile forces developed during the fire.  The second case examined, 
Alexis Nihon Plaza, investigated the capacities of weld and bolts when exposed to fire.  It 
was found from the technical report of this failure that the floor system was not exposed 
to excessive heat from the fire.  Analysis of the weld and bolts for various plate 
thicknesses revealed that it is possible for a sound design of welds could produce failure 
at relatively low temperatures.  If structural engineers are to begin designing for fire 
conditions, guidelines must be established for determining acceptable temperatures and 
standards for calculating thermal forces.   
 There are certain limitations that accompany the analyses performed for the cases 
above.  The first is the simplified equations used in the lumped mass heat transfer 
method.  These equations do not consider the spread of heat through the steel.  The values 
for the temperature change of steel according to time and gas temperature (every 50°C) 
were then used to obtain the material properties of the steel.  These equations, seen in 
Equations 6-9, are solely based on temperature, limited to 1000°C, and do not account for 
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any losses that may occur in the steel.  Since the critical temperature for most steel 
members is 593°C (Milke, 2002), determined from Figure 33, failure would likely occur 
before ever reaching 1000°C.   
 Another limitation encountered was the use of the RISA-2D software.  The two 
versions of this software differ in the complexity of the input for each program.  A more 
extensive knowledge of this program would have been useful in furthering analyses for 
the cases studied.   
 The last limitation encountered was the modes of failure determined from the 
investigative reports.  Analyses were performed with the modes of failure in mind and 
geared towards those end results.  If the failure modes had been undetermined, a much 
more broad investigation would have had to be completed to determine various modes of 
failure.   
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7 Conclusions 
 
The goal of the case study manual developed through this project is to provide 
structural engineers with a resource for the understanding of several failures that occurred 
due to fire.  The manual can be used as a teaching aid at the undergraduate and graduate 
levels.  The intention is to illustrate what went wrong in the design of the cases analyzed 
and alternatives that could have produced different outcomes.  The manual should 
stimulate discussion of the subject area and promote interest in studying the subject 
further.   
Through the analyses presented in this paper, it has been demonstrated that it is 
possible to determine modes of failure for different framing systems using simplified 
equations and models.  The results of these analyses allow for a better understanding of 
how different structural elements behave under various fire conditions.  The analyses 
performed for this project are related to specific cases but can be applied generally to 
alternative cases, allowing for structural engineers to design for fire conditions using 
simplified models.   
The 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Appendix 4: 
Structural Design for Fire Condition defines several different fires and methods by which 
analysis can be accomplished.  Since this is the first time this section has appeared in the 
Specifications, there is much room for expansion.  Alternatively, by this section 
appearing in the specification, many questions are raised with its implications.  Currently, 
the NFPA is responsible for the fired protection systems that appear in their published 
codes, so the issue of responsibility is an issue.  Also, if structural engineers are to 
assume this responsibility, their fees must increase, and peer reviewers must also learn 
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the new design analysis techniques.  Another issue that arises with designing for fire is 
the amount of material, which will increase the overall project cost for structures.  Over 
the years buildings have become lighter and lighter, and by introducing the idea of 
designing for fire goes against the standards of design and construction as presently 
practiced.  In order to move performance based design forward, the questions raised 
above must be answered.   
If these questions are answered and designing proceeds in this area, there is much 
room for the development of useful material.  By developing the available tools further 
and expanding upon them, a monograph, similar to the CRSI: Reinforced Concrete Fire 
Resistance (CRSI, 1980) book could be developed.  A book of this sort could contain 
equations and methods for analysis, state of the art designs and sample designs, and 
analysis and discussion of failure cases.   
Another direction for future work would be the development of furnace tests that 
simulate natural fires to get a more realistic idea of the behavior of systems under these 
conditions.  Connections should also be tested under both the ASTM E-119 and natural 
fire exposures to determine their behavior based on tests rather than assumptions.   
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Abstract 
 
 This manual was designed to aid in the understanding of structural steel as a 
material and the manners in which it fails when exposed to fire.  In order to accomplish 
this, four case studies of structural steel collapses due to fire were examined.  Three of 
the four cases were studied to elaborate on the mode of failure as stated through their 
technical reports.  These cases were then analyzed for alternative configurations to 
determine other modes of failure.  The fourth case was chosen to highlight the 
recommendations that came from the technical report as lessons learned that should be 
kept in mind during design.   
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1    Introduction 
 
The goal of this case study manual is to provide structural engineers with a 
resource for the understanding of several failures that occurred due to fire.  The manual 
can be used as a teaching aid at the undergraduate and graduate levels or for personal 
study.  The intention is to illustrate what went wrong in the cases analyzed and 
alternatives that could have produced different outcomes.  The manual should stimulate 
discussion of the subject area and promote interest in studying the subject further.   
The use of case studies in education has proven a good supplement to the lecture 
based teaching approach.  Investigation of subject matter through case studies illustrates 
how, when and why failures occur.  Education through this method promotes individual 
learning and an opportunity for extensive research.  This manual provides investigations 
of structural steel failures due to fire.  This subject is becoming more important as the 
trend for structural engineers to become responsible for the structural integrity of 
buildings when exposed to fire is on the rise.   
This is apparent in the 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, 
which contains a new section detailing design for fire conditions.  Appendix 4: Structural 
Design for Fire Condition defines several different fires and methods by which analysis 
can be accomplished.  One of the methods, lumped heat capacity analysis, was used for 
investigation of the cases contained in this manual.  This method uses a simple heat 
transfer analysis to determine the temperatures in the steel as a function of time and 
temperature.  The investigative approaches used, descriptions of each case, and the 
results from the investigations are presented in the sections below.    
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2 Performance Investigation 
2.1.1 Design Fires 
 
Three design fires were used in the analysis for each of the cases studied.  These fires 
simulated three different scenarios, one being a test scenario and the other two being 
natural fires.   
The first design fire was the ASTM E-119 fire, which is a test fire used to rate the 
performance of building assemblies, such as ceilings and floor systems.  There are a few 
key things to be noted associated with this fire.  The first is that since this fire is 
simulated in a furnace, the tested assemblies are prototypes of the full-scale systems.  The 
second is that structural framing continuity, member interaction, restraint conditions, 
and applied load intensity (Milke, 2002) are not applied while conducting tests under 
this fire exposure.  While the test does not account for many factors like the few listed 
above, it is an internationally established test and is therefore useful for design 
comparisons.  The gas temperatures from this fire were obtained from the ASTM E-119 
time-temperature curve, as can be seen below in Figure 1. 
ASTM E-119 Fire Time-Temperature Curve
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Figure 47 - ASTM E-119 Time-Temperature Curve 
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The second and third design fires used for analysis were a short duration-high 
intensity fire and a long duration-lower intensity fire.  These fires were both defined by 
using a temperature-time relationship equation extracted from Section 4 of the SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, which can be seen below in Equation 1. 
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Equation 10 - Expression for Defining Temperature Time Relationships 
 
 
 The equation above is used to determine the incline in natural fires.  In order to 
define each of the two fires for use, different values had to be set to determine each.  For 
the short duration-high intensity fire, the values for F=0.12m0.5, C=1.0, and t varied from 
0-0.5 hours.  At t=0.5 hours, it was assumed that the fire decayed at a rate of 20°C per 
minute until returning to room temperature of 20°C.  The short duration-high intensity 
fire curve can be seen below in Figure 2.   
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Short Duration Fire Time-Temperature Curve
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Figure 48 - Short Duration - High Intensity Time-Temperature Curve 
 
 
 The values used to define the long duration-lower intensity fire were F=0.04m0.5, 
C=1.0, and t varied from 0-1.5 hours. At t=1.5 hours, it was assumed that the fire decayed 
at a rate of 10°C per minute until returning to room temperature of 20°C.  The long 
duration-lower intensity fire curve can be seen below in Figure 3.    
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Figure 49 - Long Duration-Lower Intensity Time-Temperature Curve 
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2.1.2 Performance Calculations 
 
Once the temperatures for each of the design fires were obtained, these values 
were then used to calculate the temperature of steel as a function of the gas temperatures 
and time at every 50°C by using a heat transfer analysis and the lumped mass approach.  
The lumped mass method assumes that the steel has little resistance to heat through 
conduction, and therefore the entire steel member is at the same temperature.  The 
equation then used to acquire the change in steel temperature is seen below in Equation 2.  
This equation takes into consideration the heat capacity of the insulation as well as the 
steel as can be seen in Figure 4 below.   
 
Figure 50 - Heat Transfer through Insulation 
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Where zeta is a coefficient calculated using the equation in Equation 3 below. 
 
 
 
Equation 12 – Coefficient 
 
The value of Ai/Vs was calculated using Equation 4 below.  
 
 
Equation 13 - Section Factor Equation 
 
The time step factor ∆t was calculated using Equation 5 below. 
 
 
Equation 14 - Time Step Factor 
 
The other values supplemented into Equation 2 were taken from the tables below. 
 
 
 
Table 7 - Thermal Properties of Insulation Materials (Buchanan, 2001). 
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Table 8 - Heat Capacities of Steel 
 
For the analysis performed for each case, a spray-applied mineral fiber was used with a 
density of 300 kg/m3 , a specific heat of 1200 J/kg°C, and a thermal conductivity of 0.12 
W/m.  The specific heat of steel was taken as 520 J/kg°C, and the density used was 7850 
kg/m3, which remains essentially constant with temperature (Buchanan, 2001).  The 
calculated value for the change in steel temperature was then added to the previous 
temperature for steel to get the new steel temperature.   
 After the steel temperatures had been calculated for each fire condition, equations 
to obtain the yield strength and modulus of elasticity of the steel associated with those 
temperatures were used.  The equations for these material properties are solely a function 
of temperature and do not account for any losses that may occur.  They are taken from the 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering and can be seen below in Equations 6-9. 
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Equation 15 - Yield Strength for Temperatures between 0°C & 600°C 
 
 
Equation 16 - Yield Strength for Temperatures between 600°C & 1000°C 
 
 
Equation 17 – Modulus of Elasticity for Temperatures between 0°C & 600°C 
 
 
Equation 18 – Modulus of Elasticity for Temperatures between 600°C & 1000°C 
 
The initial yield strength for these calculations, Fy0, was taken as 36 ksi, because when 
the cases being analyzed were built between the 1950s and 1970s; this was the 
predominant strength of steel used for construction.  The initial modulus of elasticity, E0 
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used was 29,000 ksi.  The values calculated were then used as input for the RISA 2-D 
software analysis of the structural systems for the cases described below.   
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3 Case Studies 
 
There were four cases researched and analyzed for this manual.  Each building 
was constructed of structural steel, and each suffered from a major fire that lead to a 
partial or complete collapse.  The four cases analyzed are McCormick Place, Chicago, Ill 
(1967), World Trade Center 5, New York, New York (2001), Alexis Nihon Plaza, 
Montreal, CAN (1986), and One New York Plaza, New York, New York (1970).  The 
selected elements analyzed in each case are listed below in Table 3.   
 
Table 9 - Case Elements Studied 
 
3.1 McCormick Place 
 
 The first case illustrated in this manual is the fire that occurred at McCormick 
Place, Chicago, Ill in 1968.  McCormick Place was a large exhibition hall that stood on 
the shore of Lake Michigan in Chicago, Ill.  It was constructed in 1960 of reinforced 
concrete and structural steel and consisted of 3 levels of exhibition space, a large theater, 
restaurants, and a variety of other rooms and supporting spaces.  Large steel trusses 
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supported the roof of the structure; they spanned 210 feet column to column and 
cantilevered 80 feet on either side, as can be seen below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - McCormick Place Roof Truss (Jensen, 1967) 
 
The trusses were 16 deep above the rigid frame support, 10 feet deep at the center, and 
5-3-1/2 deep at the cantilevered end.  The truss and rigid frames that supported them 
were constructed of W14 wide flange members and were stabilized by smaller trusses 
running perpendicularly, similar to bridging.  The column portion of these frames were 
protected from fire with a sprayed-applied fiber and encased with metal lath and 
Gypsum vermiculite plaster, (Jensen, 1967) up to a height of 20 feet, but the trusses did 
not have any fire protection applied to them.   
Once the fire broke out, it spread rapidly through the exhibition hall.  Lack of fire 
protection caused excessive heating of the truss members, which then led to the collapse 
of the roof approximately an hour after the fire began (Jensen, 1967). It was stated that 
the roof trusses started to buckle in the center, pulling the roof loose from the columns at 
the walls, (Juillerat, 1967).   
This case was studied first and became the base case for the analyses performed 
for the others. The reason for this was that through study it clearly demonstrated the 
 104 
effectiveness of insulation.  The calculations for this analysis were performed using the 
equations presented in Section 2.1.2.  While this was the first step in the analysis of the 
other cases, it was less important because in those cases the steel had been protected with 
insulation prior to the fires.   
3.1.1 Parametric Study of Spray-Applied Insulation 
 
Analyses were performed in order to determine if spray-on insulation would have 
had any positive effect on the resistance of the steel truss to the fire. This was 
accomplished by comparing the performance of the unprotected steel truss to that of steel 
trusses with varying thickness of spray-applied insulation.  The insulation was varied 
from ‰ to 1- ‰, and the results were then plotted on the same graphs to enable 
comparison of the effects of the insulation on steel temperature over time. Also depicted 
on the graph by a thick orange line is the critical temperature for steel, which is defined 
as the temperature where steel has lost approximately 50 percent of its yield strength 
from that at room temperature, (Milke, 2002).   
 
Figure 51 - Critical Temperatures for Various Types of Steel (Milke, 2002) 
 
The yield strength of the steel (Fy) and the modulus of elasticity (E) of the steel 
during fire conditions were also investigated to illustrate the properties of steel under fire 
exposure. 
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The effects on the steel truss were modeled under the three fire conditions 
previously defined: the ASTM E-119 standard fire, a short duration-high intensity fire, 
and a long duration-lower intensity fire. These three fires each simulated a different 
scenario of fire intensity within McCormick Place and allowed for the analysis of the 
truss integrity under different scenarios.  
3.1.2 Fire Exposure 
 
The three graphs below illustrate the effect of insulation on steel temperature, 
yield strength and modulus of elasticity when exposed to the ASTM Standard E-119 fire. 
ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure
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Figure 52 –Effect of Variable Insulation Thickness on Steel Temperatures 
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Figure 53 - Effects of Insulation Thickness on Yield Strength 
 
ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure
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Figure 54 - Effects of Insulation Thickness on Modulus of Elasticity 
 
 
The next three graphs show the effect of insulation on steel temperature, yield strength 
and modulus of elasticity when exposed to a short duration-high intensity fire. 
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Short Duration Fire Exposure
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Figure 55 - Effect of Variable Insulation Thickness on Steel Temperatures 
 
Short Duration Fire Exposure 
Effects of Insulaton on Yield Strength 
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time (Min)
Yi
el
d 
St
re
n
gt
h 
(ks
i)
No Insulation
1/2" Insulation
1" Insulation
1-1/2" Insulation
 
Figure 56 - Effects of Insulation on Yield Strength 
 
 
 108 
Short Duration Fire Exposure
  Effects of Insulaton on Modulus of Elasticity 
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Figure 57 - Effects of Insulation on Modulus of Elasticity 
 
The last three graphs show the effects of insulation on steel temperature, yield strength, 
and modulus of elasticity when exposed to a long duration-lower intensity fire.   
Long Duration Fire Exposure
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Figure 58 - Effect of Variable Insulation Thickness on Steel Temperatures 
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Long Duration Fire Exposure
 Effects of Insulaton on Yield Strength
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Figure 59 - Effects of Insulation on Yield Strength 
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Figure 60 - Effects of Insulation on Modulus of Elasticity 
 
 As seen in the graphs, Figures 6, 9, and 12 above the use of any thickness of 
spray-on insulation would have reduced the temperatures of the steel truss significantly 
during all three design fires. In each case the greatest reduction of heat occurs early in the 
fire which is important because it may have given the fire department sufficient time to 
get the fire under control before excessive heating and structural instability occurred.  
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 The yield strength (Fy) and modulus of elasticity (E) of the steel truss are 
important factors, because when these values are reduced, the strength of the steel is 
reduced, which could lead to failure.  In all three cases, after one hour (approximate time 
of failure) with ‰ insulation the loss of yield strength would have been 10 ksi as 
compared with the truss with no insulation that would have lost approximately all of its 
strength.  Similarly, for the moduli of elasticity graphs, the loss for the ASTM E-119 and 
long duration fires is 5000 psi after one hour.  For the short duration fire the loss is about 
4000 psi for ‰ insulation thickness.  The loss for the cases with more insulation is less 
than that for the ‰ insulation thickness.   Under the short and long duration fire 
exposures one can see that the truss without insulation regains strength as the fire decays.  
This is true to a certain extent but unlike the graph depiction, it will never regain its full 
capacity.  The graphs are off because the equations used to calculate these values 
(Equations 6-9) only account for temperature and no other factors.   
 One difference to note between the short duration fire and the ASTM E-119 and 
long duration fires is the performance of the insulation thickness.  Under the short 
duration fire exposure, there is little difference in the performance if insulation is 
provided. This is due to the fire peaking early and gradually cooling off.  The short fire 
timeline enabled all of the insulation thickness to perform at approximately the same 
levels.  Unlike the short duration fire, a greater thickness is more effective in the ASTM 
E-119 and long duration fires. The differences between 1 and 1‰ of insulation are not 
as great as the difference between the ‰ and 1 of insulation. Because of this, it would 
be a good decision to have at least 1 of insulation under these fire conditions. 
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 The analysis performed in this investigation does not determine the mode of 
failure, however, it was discussed in the investigative report from observation that the 
trusses buckled in the center and a collapse of the roof ensued.  This is the most probable 
situation since the compression members (bottom chord of the truss) would have heated 
the quickest and experienced warping and twisting due to the extreme temperatures 
produced by the fire.  The center of the truss also did not have any diagonal members to 
support the top and bottom chord and therefore had the least resistance to failure as 
compared to the other pieces of the truss.    
3.2 World Trade Center 5  
 
World Trade Center 5 was a nine-story office building that was completed around 
1970.  The buildings dimensions were 330 ft. by 420 ft. with 30 ft. by 30 ft. bays.  The 
roof and ninth floor were constructed using conventional steel framing; the eighth floor 
and those below were constructed using column trees, as can be seen below in Figures 15 
and 16.  These trees were constructed of a 4-ft.-W24x61 stub girder shop welded to the 
columns. In the field W18x50 floor girders were connected to the stub girders using shear 
tab connections. The W24x61 member is a Canadian shape that is similar to a W24x62 
with a thinner web and shorter depth.  The floor system was constructed of 4 lightweight 
concrete on 1-1/2 metal deck, and was attached to the floor beams and girders using 
shear connectors to create a composite floor system.  All of the structural members were 
fire-protected with a sprayed-on mineral fiber that provided a 2-hour fire rating to the 
floors and a 3-hour rating to the columns (Barnett, 2002). 
Fire in this building broke out due to debris that impacted the building from the 
collapse of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.  The subsequent fires 
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caused shear connectors of the column tree assemblies to fail initiating collapse from the 
eighth floor through the fifth floor.   
 
Figure 61 - Typical Column Tree System (Barnett, 2002) 
 
 
       
 
Figure 62 - Interior Bay Framing of WTC 5 (Barnett, 2002) 
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From the investigative report of this failure, it was determined that the shear tab 
connections failed due to secondary tensile forces developed from catenary action.  
However, in order to come to this conclusion and to provide a thorough understanding of 
the failure, a much more in depth analysis was performed.  The analysis began with 
investigating the drop-span section of the column tree assembly for bending capacity and 
deflection as a function of time and temperature (calculated using the equations presented 
in Section 2.1.2).  This same analysis was then done for the two alternative situations of 
continuous W24x61 and W18x50 girders replacing the column tree assembly.   
The next step in the analysis was the investigation of the shear tab connections.  
These calculations followed those performed in Appendix B: Structural Steel and Steel 
Connections (Fisher, 2002) of the World Trade Center Building Performance Study 
(FEMA).  These calculations were extended to analyze the bolted connections from 20°C 
(room temperature) to 650°C depending on the fire exposure used.     
3.2.1 Floor Framing Analysis 
 
Performance of the floor system under fire condition was modeled using the 
RISA-2D Educational software.  In order to describe fire conditions for input into RISA-
2D, time-step temperature calculations were done to determine the temperature of the 
steel with ‰ insulation, 1 insulation, and 1-1/2 spray-applied mineral fiber insulation 
when exposed to the ASTM E-119 fire, a short duration-high intensity fire, as well as a 
long duration-lower intensity fire.  Once the temperatures of the steel were calculated (at 
every 50° C, gas temperature), the yield strength and modulus of elasticitys that 
corresponded to those temperatures were calculated using Equations 6 - 9 from the SFPE 
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Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering.  The moduli of elasticitys were then input 
into RISA to calculate the deflections associated with the increase in the temperature of 
the steel due to fire exposure.  In order to approximate the behavior of the actual 
composite floor system, the moment of inertia for the drop-span girder (W18x50) was 
adjusted to be equal to the moment of inertia for the composite system.  Also, the 
distributed load input to the program only reflected the live load to which the system 
would have been subjected, in order to account for shoring during construction, or any 
original camber that may have been present in the girder.   
 The original model was then revised to replace the column tree system with (1) a 
W24x61 continuous girder and (2) a W18x50 continuous girder.  The moments of inertia 
for both these beams was adjusted to reflect the moments of inertia of the composite 
systems, and both of these framing systems were exposed to the same loads seen by the 
original model.  Both of these alternatives also used adjusted moduli of elasticitys to 
reflect temperature for the varying insulations, as done in the original analysis.   
 The deflections for each of these systems for exposure to the three different fire 
exposures previously mentioned can be seen in the figures 17, 18, and 19 below for ‰ 
insulation thickness.     
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Figure 63 - Deflections under ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure 
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Figure 64 - Deflections under Short Duration-High Intensity Fire Exposure 
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Long Duration Fire Exposure
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Figure 65 - Deflections under Long Duration-Lower Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
The next three graphs show the deflections for each design fire using 1 insulation 
thickness.  
ASTM Fire Exposure
1" Insulation
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 200 400 600 800
Steel Temperature (°C)
De
fle
ct
io
n
 
(In
ch
es
)
Column Tree - 1"
Insul.
W24x61 - 1" Insul.
W18x50 - 1" Insul.
 
Figure 66 - Deflections under ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure 
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Figure 67 - Deflections under Short Duration-High Intensity Fire Exposure 
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Figure 68 - Deflections under Long Duration-Lower Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
 
The next three graphs show the deflection for the original and alternative framing 
systems with 1-1/2 insulation thickness, subjected to the three design fires.   
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Figure 69 - Deflections under ASTM E-119 Fire Exposure 
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Figure 70 - Deflections under Short Duration-High Intensity Fire Exposure 
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Figure 71  - Deflections under Long Duration-Lower Intensity Fire Exposure 
 
For all three insulation thicknesses, one can see that the behavior under the ASTM E-119 
curve and the long duration fire are very similar.  It can also be seen that as the insulation 
thickness becomes greater, the deflection drops.  An interesting point to note from these 
graphs is the similarity in behavior of the deflection patters, but the large difference in the 
amount of deflection between the continuous beams and the column tree assembly.   
 One should also note that the deflection limits of 0.73 (L/360) in the original 
case (L=22) and 1 (L/360) for the two continuous span alternative cases (L=30) is 
never exceeded under all three-fire conditions.  This shows that all three framing systems 
could have theoretically handled the loads under the exposed fire temperatures so the 
system would not have failed due to deflection.   
 The technical report on this failure states the structural damage due to the fires 
closely resembled that commonly observed in test assemblies exposed to the ASTM E119 
Standard Fire Test, (Barnett, 2002).  It then goes on to say that the local collapse 
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appeared to have begun at the field connection where beams were connected to shop-
fabricated beam stubs and column assemblies, (Barnett, 2002). 
3.2.2 Shear Tab Connection Analysis 
 
The next step in the analysis process was to examine the shear tab connections 
where the failure appeared to have begun.  In Appendix B of the World Trade Center 
Building Performance Study (Fisher, 2002), the three-bolt capacity, double shear 
capacity, and the tensile capacity of the shear tab connections were calculated at room 
temperature and at 550° Celsius.  This was done by adjusting the yield strength values of 
the bolts by a factor determined from Figure 26 below; extracted from Appendix A, 
Overview of Fire Protection in Buildings, WTC Building Performance Study.   
  
 
 
Figure 72 - Strength of Steel at Elevated Temperatures (qt. Milke, 2002) 
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 For the purpose of this project, these calculations were extended to obtain the 
capacities of the shear tabs in the temperature range from 20°C (room temperature) to 
700 °C.  The critical temperature for steel beams/girders is listed in Figure 5 above as 
593°C and it is a theoretical assumption that connections will degrade at the same rate or 
slower as the members they are connecting.  If this is true then the connections should not 
have failed until about 600°C, and from the technical report it states failure at a 
temperature of 550°C or less.          
Shown below, in Table 4, are the calculated values for the three-bolt capacity of 
the connections, the 3-bolt shear capacity, double shear capacity, the tensile capacity, and 
the block shear capacity.  While block shear was not a design requirement defined in the 
1963 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication & Erection of Structural Steel 
Buildings, it has been calculated for research purposes.  The tabulated values for the 
double shear capacity are compared to the plastic shear capacity of the W24x61 girder 
and W18x50 girder and are greater; therefore the connections could handle the shear 
produced under the fire conditions. These shear values do not include the added shear 
that was produced from the collapsed floor weights.  From Table 4 it can be seen that the 
governing mode of failure was from larger tension forces produced by catenary action 
than could not be withstood by the shear tab connection.  Since these forces are not 
present under normal conditions, they would not have been originally designed for.  The 
second mode of failure seen from the table would have been block shear, which was also 
not a design requirement in the 1963 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication & 
Erection of Structural Steel Buildings.  The capacity of the block shear at 200°C is less 
than the double shear capacity of the bolts and W24x61 girder at 550°C.  In order to 
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improve this, the thickness of the plate would have to double or a different bolt 
configuration could be tried.   
Table 10 - Steel Connection Capacities 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
Catenary action is a phenomenon that occurs in composite beams as a result of 
thermal expansion in the member due to elevated temperatures.  In all buildings, beams 
and girders have a certain amount of end restraint, even if simply supported.  The end 
restraints, although negligible at normal temperature, become significant at elevated 
temperature because of restraint to thermal expansion may cause enormous internal force 
and moment within the structural member, (Yu, 2005).   
Catenary action was studied for the first time after the Cardington fire tests, 
conducted in 1995 on an 8-story composite steel frame.  From these tests it was 
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determined that when fire temperatures were below 400°C the slab acted as an extension 
of the compression flange of the structural steel and had little influence on the system, but 
when temperatures exceeded 500°C the slabs became a very influential part of the 
system.  The influence of membrane tensions in the slab cannot be ignored, particularly 
when a fire compartment is subject to high horizontal restraint from surrounding cool, 
stiff structure, or when it is vertically supported around its perimeter at protected lines of 
support. When the double-curvature deflections of floor slabs become large the influence 
of tensile membrane action can become very important in supporting the slab loading, 
(Huang, 2002).  This tensile membrane action or catenary action can be useful in 
preventing a progressive collapse; however if the tensile forces developed are larger than 
the tensile capacities of the connections, the system will fail.  This is the mode of failure 
that was believed to have occurred in the World Trade Center 5 column tree assemblies 
(Barnett, 2002).  In Figure 34 below, one can see the catenary action developed in the 
upper floors that had typical structural framing. 
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Figure 73 - Catenary Action in WTC 5 
 
Since the destruction of the World Trade Center Plaza, there has been much 
research done to investigate this phenomenon.  Currently, tensile catenary action of floor 
framing members and their connections has been neither a design requirement nor a 
design consideration for most buildings, (Barnett, 2002).  One paper entitled 
Considering Catenary Action in Designing End-restrained Steel Beams in Fire provides 
simplified equations to calculate these forces as a function of temperature for end 
restrained beams.  Calculations using these equations were then compared to calculations 
done using the traditional design method to determine any advantages to using this 
approach.  It was found that there was an advantage to using this new method when 
comparing beams with only axially restrained ends, but there was little advantage when 
the members had a fair amount of rotational end restraint (Huang, 2005).  
Catenary 
Action 
 125 
One way to advance this study would be to gain a greater understanding of the 
catenary forces that were created, and compare those values with the tensile strengths of 
the plates.  Another way would be to alter the RISA model to incorporate column 
degradation as a function of time and temperature to get a more realistic model.   
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3.3 Alexis Nihon Plaza 
 
The ten-story office building (referred to as the 15-story office building in the 
official report) that was part of the Alexis Nihon Plaza was built atop a five-story 
shopping/parking facility sometime after 1950.  On the evening of October 26, 1986 at 
around 5 p.m., a fire broke out on the 10th floor and spread through stairwell B (see 
Figure 28) up to the 16th floor (there was no 13th floor).  At approximately 10:30 p.m., a 
30 ft by 40 ft. section of the 11th floor, near where the fire was believed to have 
originated, collapsed onto the 10th floor (Isner, 1986). This was the only section of the 
building that suffered collapse, and upon investigation, the collapsed members did not 
exhibit the properties commonly found of members exposed to high temperatures, such 
as bending, elongation, or twisting, (Isner, 1986).  The collapse is believed to have 
occurred because the welds connecting the girders and columns failed causing the 
collapse of a 30 ft by 40 ft. section of the 11th floor.   
The building was constructed of a structural steel frame of 11  30 ft. by 30 ft. 
bays and 3  15 ft. by 30 ft. bays, as can be seen in Section 3.3, Figure 28.  The girders 
(W24x76s), beams (W18x40s), columns and metal decking were all fire-protected with 
sprayed-on mineral fiber providing a 2  1/2 to 3 hour fire rating for the members.  The 
girder  to  column, beam  to  column, and beam  to  girder connections were made 
using double clip angles, which were welded to the beams and bolted to the columns or 
girders, (Isner, 1986).   
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Figure 74 - Alexis Nihon Tenth Floor Layout 
 
3.3.1 Framing Analysis 
 
 To begin the analysis of this system, the girders material properties were 
calculated using the equations in Section 2.1.2.  Using these values, RISA-2D WebDemo, 
was utilized to determine the end shear and moments in the girder.  These numbers were 
then used for analysis of the weld shear capacity for a variety of angle sizes, weld 
thicknesses and strength.  This analysis was also done for the bolts.  Comparison of these 
values along with the capacity of the girder, led to the determination of the failure mode 
at various temperatures for various sizes of angles.  These modes of failure are 
summarized and discussed below. 
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3.3.2 Angle Connections 
 
The information on the connections for this case was extracted from High-Rise 
Office Building Fire, Alexis Nihon Plaza, which was the investigative report of the 
failure.  The report did not provide any data on the size of the angles, weld thickness and 
strength, or the number of bolts for each connection.  Data on the connections could not 
be found in a wider search of the literature.  To get a range of data for analysis, angles of 
various sizes were used to calculate the shear capacity of the welds and the tensile, shear, 
double shear, bearing, and block shear capacities of the bolts.  The capacities are 
calculated based on geometry and material properties; they would be compared with the 
forces predicted by analyses.  Weld capacity is calculated using the moment produced 
from the girder, and the length of weld, which changes with the size of the clip angle.  
The shear capacities of the welds, bolts, and girder can be seen in the graphs below.  The 
bolts were calculated for an L8x8x1/2 angle and an L8x8x1/4 angle.  The shear 
capacities of the welds were calculated for weld metal with both a 60 ksi and 70 ksi 
tensile strength. The steel temperatures were calculated for ‰, ¾, 1, and 1-1/2 
insulation thickness for the three fire exposures.  The 3/4 insulation thickness is the 
thickness that was present in the original design.  To illustrate the difference in shear 
capacities of the structural elements, the capacities of the welds, bolts and girder were 
placed on a single graph for each of the three design fires.  The solid red line seen in 
these graphs is the end shear produced by the girder on the connections.  The three graphs 
shown below in Figures 35-37 are for a ‰ angles and a 7/16 fillet weld with a 60 ksi 
electrode.  The 60-ksi weld metal was chosen because it produces the worst-case 
scenario.    
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Capacity vs. Temperature
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Figure 75 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 7/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 76 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 7/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 77 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 7/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
 
 130 
The three graphs shown below, Figures 38-40, illustrate the shear capacities for the 
elements listed above, for a variably sized ‰ angles and a 1/4-60 ksi weld.   
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Figure 78 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 1/4" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 79 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 1/4"fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
 
 
 131 
Capacity  vs. Temperature
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Figure 80 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/2" Angle & 1/4" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
 
The three graphs below are the shear capacities of the structural elements for … angles 
with a 3/16- 60 ksi weld.   
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Figure 81 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 3/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Capacity  vs. Temperature
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Figure 82 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 3/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 83 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 3/16" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
 
The final three graphs shown are the shear capacities of the structural elements for a … 
angle and a 1/8-60 ksi weld.   
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Capacity vs. Temperature
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Figure 84 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 1/8"fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 85- Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 1/8" fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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Figure 86 - Shear Capacities - L8x8x1/4" Angle & 1/8"fillet - 60 ksi weld metal 
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By looking at the twelve graphs above, the difference in strengths of variably sized ‰ 
angles with 7/16 welds to variably sized … angles with 1/8 welds is obvious.  Below 
are tables summarizing the modes of failure by temperature for each of the cases 
illustrated.   
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Case # 1: 
 
½” Angle – 
7/16” Weld 
600°C 625°C 650°C 
ASTM Bolt Shear   
Short    
Long Bolt Shear Block Shear L7x4x1/2 
  
Case # 2: 
 
½” Angle – 
¼” Weld 575°C 585°C 600°C 610°C 650°C 
ASTM L7x4x1/2 L8x4x1/2 L8x8x1/2 L9x4x1/2   
Short      
Long L7x4x1/2 L8x4x1/2 L8x8x1/2 L9x4x1/2 
Block 
Shear L8x6x1/2 
 
Case # 3: 
 
¼” Angle 
3/16 ” 
Weld 
425°C 533°C 500°C 575°C 600°C 625°C 
ASTM L7x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x6x1/4 
Bolt Shear  
Short       
Long L7x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x6x1/4 
Bolt Shear 
Block 
Shear 
 
Case # 4: 
 
¼ ” 
Angle 
1/8” 
Weld 
50°C 200°C 320°C 500°C 585°C 600°C 625°C 
ASTM L7x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x6x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x8x1/4 
Bolt Shear  
Short L7x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4     
Long L7x4x1/4 L8x4x1/4 L9x4x1/4 L8x6x1/4 Bolt Bearing 
L8x8x1/4 
Bolt Shear 
Block 
Shear 
 
Table 11 - Failure Modes for Various Angles and Welds 
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 Under normal conditions, all of the angles and welds investigated were adequate 
but as temperatures increased due to the three simulated fires, it is apparent how long 
each weld would effectively last.  It is an assumption that connections degrade at the 
same rate as the members they connect; however, as can be seen above, this is not the 
case since the plastic shear capacity of the beam never reached the yielding end-shear 
strength of 59.18 kips.     
The investigative report for this failure stated the: 
Girders and beams supporting the collapsed section of the floor slab were virtually 
straight and did not have the typical distortion such as bending, elongation, or twisting 
associated with steel frame members that have been exposed to excessive heat and high 
temperatures.  In locations within the building, the welds that secured the clip angles to 
the columns broke, resulting in the failure of girder-to-column connections (Isner, 
1986).   
 
The reason for the welds breaking was not investigated through that report, but 
suggestions for the failure were offered, which included, effects of fire on welds, quality 
and adequacy of the welds, and the possible effects of secondary and thermal stresses, 
(Isner, 1986). 
 Through the four cases illustrated above, the effect of fire on welds is clearly 
visible.  Since the failure was attributed to breaking of the welds, cases two through four 
provide scenarios governed by failure of the end welds.  It was stated that the floor 
system was not exposed to excessive temperature; case #4 demonstrates that weld failure 
may occur at temperatures as low as 50°C.   
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
From the analysis it was determined that the insulation thickness did not alter the 
results significantly.  Changes in the angle size, weld thickness and strength however 
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altered the outcomes greatly.  As can be seen in Table 6 above, the ‰ angle, with 7/16 
weld, strength 60 ksi, would have failed by bolt shear at 600°C before any of the weld 
thicknesses tested failed.  As the angle sizes decreased and the weld sizes decreased, 
failure of the welds became the governing mode of failure.  As can be seen from Table 6, 
certain configurations of angles and welds could have contributed to failures at 
temperatures between 50°C and 320°C which are far less than the critical temperature of 
600°C for steel beams.   
The output from the analysis done for this case illustrates the potential for weld 
failure at relatively low temperatures.  The prevailing notion is that beam failure would 
occur before connection failure due to the location and size (in terms of material) of the 
connections.  However, the results presented above disprove that notion.  To get a more 
realistic picture of what shear forces and moments were sustained by the welds, one 
could proceed with the RISA analysis and alter the strength of the columns with time as a 
function of temperature.  One could also perform a finite element analysis for just the 
angles to determine the internal stresses in the member.   
 
3.4 One New York Plaza 
 
One New York Plaza was a 50-story office building, the first 20 stories are 
approximately 222 feet by 286 feet and the next 30 stories (the tower section) are 
approximately 143 feet by 286 feet, (Powers, 1970).  The building was constructed of a 
reinforced concrete core with an outer structural steel frame and a composite floor 
system.  The beams, girders, and columns were all protected with a sprayed-on asbestos 
fiber, which was later found to have not adhered properly to the steel due to rust.   
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On August 5, 1970 a fire broke out on the 33rd floor, which was believed to have 
started in a telephone equipment room.  The fire caused shear connections to fail and 
beams to drop onto girder flanges, resulting in a partial collapse of the 34th floor.     
 One New York Plaza was a case chosen to illustrate the lessons learned that 
were generated from this fire.  While member collapses occurred due to the failing of end 
connections and lack of fireproofing, these were very localized and did not give way to a 
progressive collapse.  The importance of this case is the recommendations that came from 
the report, some of which changed local law and practices, and some of which went 
unheeded and the consequences of such actions would be seen again.   
 There were fourteen recommendations that came from the investigative report of 
this fire.  The suggestions made were for all buildings similar to One New York Plaza 
and not specific to just that building.  The recommendations are listed below (Powers, 
1970): 
15. The use of highly flammable foamed cushioning should be prohibited. 
16. The total fire load of fire resistive buildings must be reduced or automatic 
sprinklers installed. 
17. Wire (power and communication) in any part of an air conditioning system should 
be encased in metal conduit or ducts. 
18. The protection of steel members in a really fire resistive building must be 
accomplished by materials that cannot be readily removed or damaged.  It is 
apparent that sprayed fiber may not be universally applied to the proper thickness, 
that proper adhesion to steel may not take place and that the protection may be 
removed in many locations, such as at partitions, where ducts or wiring is run, and 
where clamps and brackets are attached.   
19. Vertical flues in exterior walls between the skin and inner walls of partition 
should be cut off at each floor by a horizontal fire barrier with fire resistance 
equal to the floor. 
20. Where openings through floors for air conditioning ducts are permitted, the duct 
should go directly to a non-combustible material in the duct passage. 
21. Wiring connections through floors should be provided with thermal insulation to 
prevent transmission of heat thereby negating the fire resistance of the floor. 
22. Air conditioning system should preferably be restricted to serving only one floor. 
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23. Automatic smoke detectors should be provided at each opening in the return air 
shaft unless the building is sprinklered. 
24. Air supply for computer rooms should be from a location remote from the 
building air-conditioning intake and discharge, so that the computer rooms will 
not be subject to smoke from fires in other sections of the building. 
25. Means should be provided for venting the building during a fire.   
26. Elevator call buttons should not be of a type that will call and elevator to a floor 
because of heat, smoke or flames. 
27. Prefire plans should be drawn up for all buildings.  This should include 
procedures for notifying occupants, calling the fire department, routes of exiting 
form the various floors and protection of valuable equipment.   
28. Special equipment for fire department use for operating windows, shutters, fans 
and elevators should be provided and a planned procedure for emergency 
operation of the air conditioning system should be formulated (Powers, 1970). 
 
In some respects, building design and construction has come a long way since this fire.  
Advancements in fire protection and compartmentalization have aided in the containment 
of fire.  Buildings of a certain size and classification must now be equipped with 
automatic sprinklers by law.  Also required by law are pre-fire plan evacuation routes, 
lighted exit signs, and other requirements that aid in the preservation of lives.     
 The three major recommendations that failed to initiate any change are numbers 
one, four and eight.  While fire retardant material is more commonly used today, plush 
furniture and excess material continue to severely increase the fuel loads in buildings.   
 Due to cost, the means of insulating steel and air-conditioning a building have not 
changed.  The issue of insulating steel in a manner that does not sacrifice the integrity of 
the steel if removed has been seen time and time again in the aftermath of One New York 
Plaza.  Most recently are the cases of World Trade Center collapses.  In the case of One 
New York Plaza, the steel beams were insulated with a spray-applied asbestos fiber, 
however due to rust on the original steel; the fiber did not adhere properly.  Also, in 
places that the protection did adhere, it was removed for the installation of ducts, wiring, 
or other work done in the building.  The fire began and quickly spread through openings 
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in the ceiling where the tiles had been removed for wiring.  The combination of the 
missing ceiling tiles and the lack of insulation allowed excessive heat to penetrate the 
steel.  The temperatures reached resulted in bending and twisting of the steel beams and 
shear failure of the end connections.  The integrity of spray-applied insulation and quality 
was again questioned, in almost the same words, by the 2002 FEMA World Trade Center 
Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and 
Recommendations. 
 In the 1970s there was a large demand for sprinkler installation throughout high-
rise buildings.   Since then, it has been the trend to decrease the thickness of insulation if 
automatic sprinklers have been installed.  However, the effectiveness of automatic 
sprinklers is not certain, as seen in WTC 5 when the sprinklers did not operate to control 
the fire.  In many cases automatic sprinklers become inoperable, for example, when the 
metal heads fuse due to the heat generated by the fire or are designed incorrectly.   
 While it is more economical to reduce the insulation if adding automatic 
sprinklers, it may not be the best option from a structural standpoint.  If the sprinklers are 
ineffective, then the structure is left exposed to the fire.  Recommendations such as the 
ones presented above, as well as those from other failures due to fire should be kept in 
mind during design in order to design safer structures and avoid failure.   
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4 Discussion & Conclusions 
 
The cases investigated above and their modes of failure were done so to provide 
structural engineers with information regarding failures caused by fire.  Through the 
series of case investigations, the reader can see the original and alternative modes of 
failure.  This manual was designed to be a teaching aid and to promote interest and 
discussion in this field of study.   
There are several assumptions that must be noted when studying this manual.  The 
first, and perhaps most important was the assumed mode of failure for each case.  These 
were determined from the investigative reports of the failures studied.   
Other assumptions made involved the heat transfer analyses.  The analyses 
performed in this project to determine the steel temperatures and material properties 
(yield strength and modulus of elasticity) are based on the lumped mass heat transfer 
method.  In order to use this approach, certain assumptions were made.  The first 
assumption made was the temperature of the steel throughout the entire cross section was 
at the same temperature.  This was done to simplify the analysis.  This is based on the 
fact that steel is a good conductor of heat; however a constant temperature throughout a 
member is not generally the case under real fire conditions. Other assumptions made in 
these analyses were the values for the material properties of the steel and insulation, 
which can be seen in Tables 3 and 4.   
Secondary analyses of the connections in the World Trade Center 5 and Alexis 
Nihon Plaza cases involved the use of RISA-2D structural analysis software.  This 
software was used to determine the forces in the members of the framing systems for 
each case.  For input into this program, some information was known, but not all, which 
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led to assumptions of the boundary conditions, material properties, and loading of the 
members.  One major assumption made was that as the steel girders in the composite 
systems degraded the columns maintained their original properties.  While columns often 
have a thicker fire protection layer and lag the degradation of the other members, they do 
still degrade to some extent with respect to fire.   
 There are certain limitations that accompany the assumptions and analyses 
performed for the cases investigated.  The first is the simplified equations used in the 
lumped mass heat transfer method.  These equations do not consider the spread of heat 
through the steel.  The values for the temperature change of steel according to time and 
gas temperature (calculated every 50°C) were then used to obtain the material properties 
of the steel.  These equations, seen in Equations 6-9, are solely based on temperature, 
limited to 1000°C, and do not account for any losses that may occur in the steel.  Since 
the critical temperature for most steel members is 593°C (Milke, 2002), determined from 
Figure 33, failure would likely occur before ever reaching 1000°C.   
 Another limitation encountered was the use of the RISA-2D software.  The two 
versions of this software differ in the complexity of the input for each program.  A more 
extensive knowledge of this program would have been useful in furthering analyses for 
the cases studied.   
 The last limitation encountered was the modes of failure determined from the 
investigative reports.  Analyses were performed with the modes of failure in mind and 
geared towards those end results.  If the failure modes had been undetermined, a much 
broader investigation would have had to be completed to determine various modes of 
failure.   
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 In the case study manual developed, two major points have arisen.  The first is the 
importance of insulation, which includes but is not limited to, the insulation material, its 
application, and the quality control issues that arise with insulation.  As was discussed in 
the recommendations from the One New York Plaza investigative report, the application 
of spray-applied insulation material needs to be controlled or inspected in a manner as to 
ensure effectiveness.  This point was again raised in the FEMA World Trade Center 
Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and 
Recommendations 30 years later.  
The second point was the need for an in-depth study of the behavior of 
connections.   
The performance of connections seem to often determine whether collapse is 
localized or leads to a progressive collapse.  In the standard fire tests of structural 
members, the member to be tested is wedged into a massibe restraining frame.  
No connections are involved.  The issue of connection performance under fire 
exposure is critical to understanding building performance and should be a subject 
of further research, (Milke, 2002). 
 
 Three of the four cases examined suffered collapses due to connection failure.  In 
the analysis of the World Trade Center 5, it was determined that the shear tab connections 
failed due to extreme tensile and shear (due to collapse loads) forces acting on the 
connections.  The design of simple shear connections would not have included analysis 
for the secondary tensile forces developed during the fire.  The second case examined, 
Alexis Nihon Plaza, investigated the capacities of weld and bolts when exposed to fire.  It 
was found from the technical report of this failure that the floor system was not exposed 
to excessive heat from the fire.  Analysis of the weld and bolts for various plate 
thicknesses revealed that it is possible for a sound design of welds could produce failure 
at relatively low temperatures.  If structural engineers are to begin designing for fire 
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conditions, guidelines must be established for determining acceptable temperatures and 
standards for calculating thermal forces.   
Through the analyses presented, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to 
determine modes of failure for different framing systems using simplified equations and 
models.  The results of these analyses allow for a better understanding of how different 
structural elements behave under various fire conditions.  The analyses performed for this 
project are related to specific cases but can be applied generally to alternative cases, 
allowing for structural engineers to design for fire conditions using simplified models.   
The 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Appendix 4: 
Structural Design for Fire Condition defines several different fires and methods by which 
analysis can be accomplished.  Since this is the first time this section has appeared in the 
Specifications, there is much room for expansion.  Alternatively, by this section 
appearing in the specification, many questions are raised with its implications.  Currently, 
the NFPA is responsible for the fired protection systems that appear in their published 
codes, so the issue of responsibility is an issue.  Also, if structural engineers are to 
assume this responsibility, their fees must increase, and peer reviewers must also learn 
the new design analysis techniques.  Another issue that arises with designing for fire is 
the amount of material, which will increase the overall project cost for structures.  Over 
the years buildings have become lighter and lighter, and by introducing the idea of 
designing for fire goes against the standards of design and construction as presently 
practiced.  In order to move performance based design forward, the questions raised 
above must be answered.   
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If these questions are answered and designing proceeds in this area, there is much 
room for the development of useful material.  By developing the available tools further 
and expanding upon them, a monograph, similar to the CRSI: Reinforced Concrete Fire 
Resistance book could be developed.  A book of this sort could contain equations and 
methods for analysis, state of the art designs and sample designs, and analysis and 
discussion of failure cases.   
Another direction for future work would be the development of furnace tests that 
simulate natural fires to get a more realistic idea of the behavior of systems under these 
conditions.  Connections should also be tested under both the ASTM E-119 and natural 
fire exposures to determine their behavior based on tests rather than assumptions.   
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Appendix B 
 
Sample Calculations and Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
Sample Lumped Mass Heat Capacity Analysis Calculations     
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Sample Deflection Calculations 
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Sample Steel Connection Calculations 
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Sample Weld Calculations 
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RISA – 2D Sample Models 
Educational & WebDemo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RISA-2D Educational 
 
World Trade Center 5 – Original Framing System Model 
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RISA – 2D WebDemo 
 
Alexis Nihon Plaza Framing Model 
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Alexis Nihon Plaza Sample Results 
